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"FAIR VALUE" DETERMINATION IN CORPORATE
"FREEZE-OUTS," AND IN SECURITY AND
EXCHANGE ACT SUITS: WEINBERGER,
OTHER, AND BETTER METHODS
INTRODUCTION
Objective of Note
Federal and state courts1 have struggled with the task of
establishing an adequate remedy2 for both minority shareholders' in
freeze-out4 situations and for plaintiffs5 in civil actions involving viola-
tions of the Security Acts.' In both freeze-out and civil SEC violation
cases the courts have tested7 the price at which the minority
1. See infra text accompanying notes 120-349, 485-572.
2. A major objective of this note is to propose flexible guidelines which can
assist in providing an adequate remedy in both state freeze-out actions and private
civil actions involving violations of the Security and Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C.
S 78a-78jj (1976). See also infra text accompanying notes 573-624.
3. For the purposes of this note, a minority shareholder is a shareholder
who owns less than 50 percent of the equity in the company at issue.
4. Some jurisdictions have made the term freeze-out and the term squeeze-
out synonymous:
[Epimination of a minority shareholder is commonly referred to as a 'freeze-
out' or a 'squeeze-out.' It may be defined as the use of corporate control
vested in the statutory majority of shareholders or the board of direc-
tors to eliminate minority shareholders from the enterprise or to reduce
to relevant insignificance their voting power or claims on corporate assets.
Gabhart v. Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370, 383, 370 N.E.2d 345, 353 (1977). In Miller v. Steinbach,
268 F. Supp. 255, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), the court stated that the term "freeze-out" implies
a forced liquidation of a minority shareholder's stock by the controlling shareholder.
While the courts have viewed freeze-out as a forced sale with no legitimate business
purpose, the Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger v. UOP Inc., 426 A.2d 1333 (Del.
Ch. 1981), rev'd, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), eliminated the "business purpose" require-
ment. See infra notes 238-349 and accompanying text.
5. Parties injured by violations of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1976), might have an implied cause of action in the federal courts.
Federal courts have recognized a civil implied cause of action for violations of the
anti-fraud sectinn 10(b) since 1946. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512
(E.D. Pa. 1946). See also infra text accompanying notes 485-572.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 485-572.
7. The courts have tried to first determine whether the transaction was "fair."
If the transaction was not found to be fair, the courts tried to determine the fair
value of the minority shareholder's stock. See infra text accompanying notes 562-72,
577-604.
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shareholder sold his stock against the stock's "fair value."' The courts
have proceeded on a case-by-case basis looking for the elusive fair
value.' Unfortunately, the case-by-case approach has provided few
guidelines for future fair value determinations.'0
The concept of protecting the minority shareholder in freeze-out
situations has recently undergone a substantial change in the Delaware
courts." While the Delaware courts have changed the character of
evidence allowed to prove fair value' 2 and have expanded the concept
of fair value,'3 they have not established guidelines to facilitate the
planning capability of either the corporation, the majority shareholders,
or the minority shareholders.14 On the other hand, the federal courts
in actions under the Securities Acts have established some guidelines
for testing the fairness of a transaction."5 However, the usefulness
of these guidelines are limited. 6
This note develops potential judicial guidelines for determining
"fair value." The guidelines proposed by this note are consistent with
the new Delaware methods for determining fair value. The proposed
guidelines use modern financial analysis and promotes the policies of
both state and federal jurisdictions. Some policy concerns and objec-
tives are illustrated by looking at the historical development of
minority shareholder protection in freeze-out actions.
8. Defining "fair value" is one of the objectives of this note. The earlier
decisions interchanged the terms "fair value," "intrinsic value," and "true value," as
in Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 395 A.2d 730 (Del. Ch. 1978), modified, 413 A.2d 137
(Del. 1980).
9. The note will illustrate the evolution of the concept of fair value from
the earlier notions of intrinsic value to the concept of fair value suggested by this
note. See infra text accompanying notes 573-623.
10. The "fair value" concept evolved through a seemingly structured analysis
termed the "Delaware block" valuation method. See infra text accompanying notes
68-102. However, the final step of the Delaware block valuation procedure consisted
of a subjective weighing process, which cast the entire analysis into a case-by-case
analysis and provided few guidelines for either corporate or shareholder planning. See
infra text accompanying notes 102-08.
11. In 1983, the Delaware Supreme Court eliminated the Delaware block valua-
tion method, modifying the appraisal remedy. The modified appraisal remedy allows
the use of modern financial analysis to determine fair value. Further, the entire con-
cept of "fair value" has been expanded, making the modified appraisal more flexible.
See infra text accompanying notes 238-349.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. The modified appraisal, while more flexible, provides few guidelines. See
infra text accompanying notes 333-49.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 562-72.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 562-72.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 54-349.
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Historically, Delaware courts and the courts of many other
jurisdictions used the appraisal remedy 8 to protect the minority
shareholders' interest. 9 The purpose of the appraisal was to insure
that the minority shareholder would receive a fair value for his stock.'
The structured procedure for conducting the appraisal was termed
the "Delaware block" valuation method.2'
The traditional" remedy of appraisal, which incorporated the
Delaware block valuation method, was replaced by the Delaware
Supreme Court with an expanded, more flexible appraisal remedy. 3
The purpose of the appraisal remedy continues to be the determina-
tion of what constitutes fair value." But the Delaware Supreme Court
subsequently expanded both the procedure used in finding fair value
and the conceptual definition of fair value.25 The new remedy allows
values derived from modern financial analysis to be admitted into
evidence.26 The resulting values are then used to test the fairness
of the proposed price27 advocated by the majority shareholder, cor-
poration, on any potential acquirer.28 Further, the new remedy ex-
pands the restricted "going concern"' concept by allowing the con-
sideration of other possible values that might result from an arm's
length negotiation.' By this new test, Delaware has relaxed the struc-
18. The appraisal remedy is a process of demanding a judicial determination
of fair value for a dissenting shareholder.
The dissenting shareholder's appraisal remedy is essentially a
statutory creation to enable shareholders who object to certain extraor-
dinary matters to dissent and to require the corporation to buy their shares
at the value immediately prior to the approval of such matter and thus
to withdraw from the corporation. In different jurisdictions, the appraisal
remedy often applies to sales of substantially all corporation assets other
than in the regular course of business, mergers and consolidations, more
rarely to certain amendments of the articles of incorporation or
miscellaneous matters, but not to dissolution.
Black's Law Dictionary 92 (5th ed. 1979).
19. The appraisal remedy "was exacted to protect the minority interest, when
the common law rule of unanimity was abolished." Gabhart v. Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370,
382, 370 N.E.2d 345, 353 (1977).
20. See infra notes 338, 339.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 54-119.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 54-119.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 238-349.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 333-49.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 333-49.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 333-42, 348.
27. See infra text accompanying note 337.
28. See infra text accompanying note 337.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 343-49, 424-55.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 424-55.
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tured Delaware block valuation procedure in favor of a more flexible
and expanded remedy.
Scope of Note
First, the procedures used to apply the traditional Delaware block
valuation method will be discussed. 1 The traditional method of valua-
tion used as the basis of the appraisal remedy was a structured
approach with little flexibility. 2 This made the appraisal remedy
suitable only for limited applications.
As the courts attempted to apply the appraisal remedy to new
situations, its limitations became apparent.3 The limitations of the
appraisal remedy will be illustrated by examining its usefulness in
determining the "fair value" of the natural resource companies'
equity.' The three cases examined in this note 5 illustrate the factors
which led to the Delaware courts' change in the appraisal remedy.
In order to make the appraisal remedy more widely applicable, the
Delaware Supreme Court expanded the remedy by making it more
flexible. 7
The flexibility of the appraisal remedy was enhanced by
eliminating its highly structured approach38 and by allowing the use
of modern financial analysis to help test the fairness of the cash out
price. 9 By looking at some of the more widely accepted valuation
31. The note examines the evolution in appraisals and fairness procedures
with respect to natural resource companies where the majority shareholder dealt both
fairly and unfairly with the minority shareholders. From a case analysis, this note
proposes some flexible guidelines for determining fair value by first examining fair
dealing. See infra text accompanying notes 573-624.
32. Under the traditional Delaware block approach, flexibility only existed
in the weighing of the component analysis values; in this area, virtually no guidelines
existed. See infra text accompanying notes 102-08. In addition, no flexibility existed
with regard to what types of component analyses could be considered under the tradi-
tional Delaware block valuation.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 109-349.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 109-349.
35. Bell v.'Kirby Lumber Corp., 395 A.2d 730 (Del. Ch. 1978), modified, 413
A.2d 137 (Del. 1980) (Judgment for defendants); Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 351
A.2d 570 (Del. Ch. 1976) (Judgment for defendants), rev'd and remanded, 383 A.2d 278
(Del. 1978), on remand, 402 A.2d 497 (Del. Ch. 1979); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426
A.2d 1333 (Del. Ch. 1981) (found for defendants), rev'd, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
36. See infra text accompanying notes 238-349.
37. Weinberger, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
38. Id.
39. Id.
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theories," this note points out arguments for and against the
appropriateness of individual valuation theories." However, before any
theory can be helpful in determining fair value, the current definition
of fair value must be established."
The Delaware block method defined fair value as the minority
shareholder's interest in a "going concern."' The new appraisal method
does not retreat from the requirement of a going concern;" rather,
it expands the going concern concept to include values that could result
from arm's length negotiations.45 Four possible values are examined
to delineate the range of possible values: the minority ownership value,
the controlling interest value, the 100% ownership value, and the value
to the acquirer. The note then examines the various methods of deter-
mining these values and the ultimate question of which value is the
"fair value."
Federal jurisdictions have also tested the fairness of the price
paid to a minority shareholder ' when a majority shareholder was
found in violation of the Securities Acts." In testing the fairness of
the price paid to the minority shareholder, some federal courts have
adopted an approach which uses modern financial analysis." However,
the inherent limitations in the underlying theory limit the analysis'
applicability.49
The fairness test proposed is based on the Delaware court's
stated objective of "entire fairness."5 The amount determined to be
the fair value will be an inverse function of the degree of unfair deal-
ing found by the court. This variance in fair value will be limited
40. See infra text accompanying notes 350-423.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 350-484.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 424-55.
43. See infra note 108.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 424-55.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 424-55.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 485-572.
47. See supra note 5.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 562-72. See also Seaboard World Airlines,
Inc. v. Tiger Int'l, Inc., 600 F.2d 355, 361 (2d Cir. 1979), citing, Mills v. Electric Auto
Lite, 552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1977). The court used the "efficient market theory." For
a discussion of the "efficient market hypothesis." See infra text accompanying notes
360-74.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 571-72.
50. For a definition of entire fairness, see infra notes 576 and accompanying
1985]
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by the requirement that fair value should be a possible arm's length
negotiated value.5 1 However, an arm's length price can vary from high
to low, from the value to the acquirer," to the value of a minority
interest in the going concern prior to the merger. The lowest possible
arm's length value is the value of a minority interest, which was the
value sought by the Delaware block method.' The proposed guidelines
provide a basis for determining fair value within the range of possible
arm's length values for both federal Security Acts actions and state
freeze-out actions in the jurisdictions that follow the Delaware lead
of rejecting the traditional Delaware block valuation method.
SECTION I-DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF THE
DELAWARE BLOCK VALUATION METHOD
Under common law, a unanimous shareholder vote was required
to approve a major sale of corporate assets or a corporate merger.'
Since one shareholder could prevent a proposed asset sale or merger,
many state legislatures felt that this was an unreasonable restraint
on corporate activity.' Legislatures, therefore, enacted various statutes
allowing mergers with a less than unanimous consent of the
shareholders.' As a result of a sale of assets or a merger with a less
than unanimous shareholder vote, a dissenting shareholder could be
put into a precarious position.57 The shareholder was forced to either
sell his stock or participate in the merger.' Responding to allegations
51. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710 n.7; citing, Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co.,
267 A.2d 883, 886 (Del. 1970) ("Particularly in a parent subsidiary context, a showing
that the actions taken was as though each of the contending parties had in fact exerted
its bargaining power against the other at arm's length is strong evidence that the
transaction meets the test of fairness.")
Further, the Weinberger court preferred arm's length dealing and required entire
fairness when the majority shareholder was dealing with the minority shareholder.
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710, 711.
52. See infra text accompanying notes 424-84.
53. See infra note 108.
54. See note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutues, 79
HARV. L. REV. 1453 (1966) (hereinafter cited as Appraisal Statutes).
55. See Squires, The Diversity Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy Under the Illinois
Business Corporations Act, 53 ILL. B. J. 482, 483 (1965) (hereinafter cited as Squires).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 487-89.
58. This result may be viewed as a private eminent domain action Universal
City Studios v. Francis I. DuPont & Co., Inc., 343 A.2d 629 (Del. Ch. 1975) (The power
of a majority stockholder to override minority dissenters and remit them to the cash
remedy is analogous to the right of eminent domain.) See also Appraisal Statutes, supra
note 54, at 1455.
[Vol.19
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of abuse, the legislatures provided the dissenting shareholder some
assurance of receiving a "fair value" for his stock.59
The protection provided was in the form of the appraisal
remedy.' The purpose of the appraisal was to determine the fair value
of the dissenter's stock." If the stock was purchased at a price less
than the determined fair value, the dissenting shareholder received
the difference plus interest.2 Armed with the alternative of an
appraisal remedy, the dissenting shareholder had the option of receiv-
ing a judicial valuation of his equity interest, if he felt the offered
price did not represent his stocks' fair value.' The valuation right
granted by statute" was designed to assure the dissenting shareholder
receipt of the "intrinsic or fair value"6 for his interest. In the course
of shareholder litigation, the Delaware courts developed a structured
valuation method called the "Delaware block"" which ultimately gained
wide acceptance. 7
VALUATION USING THE DELAWARE BLOCK METHOD
The Delaware block valuation method was used in Delaware to
determine the "fair value" of stock owned by minority shareholders
until Weinberger v. Universal Oil Products (UOP). The Delaware block
method consisted of three component values that were each weighted
by the judge according to the attendant circumstances of the case. 9
59. Stock is defined for the purposes of this note as the equity ownership
in a corporation.
60. See supra note 18.
61. See infra notes 337-39 and accompanying text.
62. Appraisal Statutes, supra note 54, at 1453-56.
63. A determination of the value of corporate stock may be commenced by
the surviving corporation or any stockholder who makes a timely demand for an
appraisal. Kaye v. Pantone, Inc., 395 A.2d 369 (Del. Ch. 1978).
64. The Delaware appraisal rights statute does not grant appraisal in all cir-
cumstances. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 262(b) (Supp. 1982). This statute specifies when an
appraisal remedy is available. For instance, an appraisal is not available in Delaware
resulting from a sale of assets or for shares which are traded on a national exchange,
unless the facts fall under various exceptions such as a merger under DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, S 253 (1973).
65. See supra note 8.
66. In 1947, the state of Delaware was the first to use this method of valua-
tion which consisted of weighing three valuation methods by the judge to fit the cir-
cumstances of the appraisal. In re General Realty & Utilities Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 480,
52 A.2d 6 (1947).
67. See Appraisal Statutes, supra note 54, at 1457.
68. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
69. See supra note 66. The Delaware block method of valuation was used ex-
tensively until February 1983, when modified by Weinberger. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 238-349.
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The valuation analyses that comprised the Delaware block are usual-
ly labled market value analysis,7" asset value analysis,' and discounted
earnings value analysis.' While other factors may be considered,73 final
determination of fair value was usually based on a weighted average
of the values derived from the component analyses.74 The Delaware
block method can be analyzed by first looking at its three component
analyses followed by an examination of its weighting procedure.
Examination of the Component Analyses
The analytical component, market value, as used in the Delaware
block method, is not necessarily the current market value," but could
be a market value averaged over the time period immediately prior
to such triggering actions as a major asset sale or a proposed merger.76
A few early appraisal statutes stated that the purpose of the appraisal
was to determine market value; and, if a market value existed, it would
be the "fair value."" Some of these statutes were later amended by
deleting the reference to market value and stating that the purpose
of the appraisal was to determine "fair value" or "intrinsic value."7
70. See infra text accompanying notes 75-85.
71. See infra text accompanying notes 86-92.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 93-101.
73. Depending on the facts of the case other factors may be considered such
as: the firm's dividend yield, the firm's industry, the firm's standing in the industry,
and a comparison of the firm's stock price to that of similar companies. The court
in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis I. DuPont, & Co., 312 A.2d 344 (Del. Ch.
1973), affd, 334 A.2d 216 (Del. 1975), considered other factors such as the firm's industry,
but held that since dividends reflect the same value as nonretained earnings, they
should not be considered separately.
The Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger v. UOP Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713
(Del. 1983), reaffirmed the holding in Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 523,
74 A.2d 71 (1950), which requires consideration of all relevant factors that affect the
value of the company.
74. See Appraisal Statutes, supra note 54, at 1468-71. See also infra text
accompanying notes 102-08.
75. Depending on the court, the market value component could be the market
price at the time of the merger or cash-out, as found by the lower court in Weinberger.
Weinberger, 426 A.2d 1333, 1360 (Del. Ch. 1981). If no market value exists, a
reconstructed market value can be considered, if it can be constructed. Chicago Corp.
v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142, 172 A.2d 452 (1934). Further, the court in Francis I. duPont
& Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344 (Del. Ch. 1973), aff'd, 334 A.2d
216 (Del. 1975) held that the market value, even a reconstructed market value, must
be considered whenever available.
76. See Appraisal Statutes, supra note 54, at 1460, 1461.
77. See Squires, supra note 55, at 484 n.9.
78. Illinois dropped the requirement of market value when the state changed
its 1919 Corporation Act in 1933. See Squires, note 55 at 424. See also supra notes
8, 9, 339.
[Vol.19
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In some jurisdictions, recent statutes state that if the stock is traded
on a national exchange, the appraisal remedy is not available."
Federal jurisdictions that make fair value determinations of
publicly traded securities generally attribute at least some weight to
the securities' market value. 0 Jurisdictions using the Delaware block
method of valuation also consider market value an important compo-
nent of the weighted average determination of "fair value."'" The
degree of significance placed on market value is determined by such
factors as the state of the economy," the type of company," and how
widely the company's stock is traded.' Therefore, a jurisdiction using
the Delaware block valuation method considers the stock's market
value when it is available.8 Although market value is an important
element, it is not the exclusive factor in the Delaware block method."8
Earnings value and asset value must also be considered when con-
ducting a Delaware block valuation.
When considering the asset value component, the courts have
been careful to distinguish the value of the company's assets as a
going concern from their liquidation value." Even so, the asset value
analysis generally consists of merely an appraisal of the firm's assets.'
Normally a firm that is ripe for a merger or asset sale owns assets
that are either highly liquid or carried on the books at less than their
market value." Therefore, the firm's asset value can be different from
the firm's book value. Book value is based on acquisition cost less
depreciation, and thus does not reflect the market value of the firm's
assets.' To determine the market value of the firm's assets, the
79. See supra note 64.
80. The federal courts have considered the market value to be almost con-
clusive proof of the value to the firm before the merger transaction. See Seaboard
World Airlines, Inc. v. Tiger Int'l, Inc., 600 F.2d 355, 361 (2d Cir. 1979) (Although Tiger's
asset value exceeded its market value, the market value was found to be the stock's
fair value.); cf. Mills v. Electric Auto Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239, 1247-48. (7th Cir. 1977)
(The court primarily used the firm's market value to determine "fair value.") See also
infra note 107.
81. See supra note 75.
82. Appraisal Statutes, supra note 54, at 1464.
83. Id. at 1463.
84. Id. at 1460.
85. See supra note 75, 107.
86. See supra note 73.
87. Appraisal Statutes, supra note 54, at 1457.
88. Id. at 1460.
89. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control
and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1, 7 n.19 (1978).
90. Appraisal Statutes, supra note 54, at 1457.
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appraiser or financial analyst must examine and evaluate each of the
firm's major assets and liabilities.9' The analyst should then be able
to explain any discrepancies between the firm's net book value and
the market value of its assets.2
The third component analysis of the Delaware block method is
the discounted earnings analysis.9 3 The concept underlying this theory
is that a company's value, as a going concern, is a function of its ability
to generate earnings.' The earnings benefit the shareholders through
stock appreciation or increased dividends. This analysis projects a
stream of future earnings and then discounts the earnings stream.
The discount rate must reflect both the time value of money and the
company's business risks. Therefore, the discounted earnings ap-
proach is a two step procedure usually starting with projected
earnings.
The projected stream of earnings, as used in the Delaware block
method, was normally the average earnings of a number of past
years." However, some jurisdictions adjust past earnings before they
are averaged. 7 The adjustment reflects non-recurring items in either
sales or expenses. After the projected stream of earnings is
established, the appraiser or analyst must determine the proper dis-
count rate.
91. The differences between book value and asset market value might result
from many other factors, such as: uncollectable accounts receivable carried on the books,
long term securities tied into an interest rate which is different than the market rate,
undeveloped patents and other trade secrets, depreciation taken on an asset which
does not correspond to its value, etc. See Appraisal Statutes, supra note 54, at 1457.
92. Id. at 1457-60.
93. Some authors term the discounted earnings approach as an investment
value. The analysis derives the firm's value from the firm's earnings capacity. Ap-
praisal Statutes, supra note 54, at 1464.
94. Id.
95. The formula for making a projection is: V=E E/(l+r)', where:
V= The value of the firm.
E=Projected annual earnings or dividends. (Under the Delaware block
method, as used in Delaware, earnings (E) is equal to the average (mean)
of earnings for five years immediately prior to the triggering action.)
(NOTE: The difference in a value obtained by using earnings rather
than dividends would be compensated for by a different discount rate r.)
n=The number of periods. (usually one year or fraction thereof.)
r=The discount rate reflecting the time value of money and the risk of
the firm. Appraisal Statutes, supra note 54, at 1464-68.
96. Id.
97. The court, in Application of Delaware Racing Assn., 42 Del. Ch. 406, 421-22,
213 A.2d 203, 212 (Del. 1965), did not use the year suggested by the appraiser, 158,
when computing the five year earings average, because the court felt the earnings
during (1958) were abnormally high.
98. Id.
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In order to find the appropriate discount rate, analysts have
generally used earnings multipliers designated as price/earnings
ratios.9 The appropriate price/earnings ratio is determined by com-
paring the price/earnings ratios of other similarly situated publicly
traded companies.190 Once the price/earnings ratio is determined, it
is then multipled by the firm's average earnings.10 The product is
equal to the earnings value of the firm. The analyst, and ultimately
the court, then weights the three values derived from the component
analyses to determine the "fair value" of the minority shareholders'
stock interest.
The Weighting Procedure
The process used to find fair value from the component analyses
is termed weighting. °2 The weighting process is accomplished by
multiplying each value derived from the component analyses by a
percentage, termed weights. The sum of all three percentages must
equal 100%.113 Therefore, if the court decides to give the discounted
earning value a 50% weight and the asset value a 30% weight, the
market value would receive a 20% weight. 104 The decision to assign
99. See infra note 101. The price/earnings ratio is no more than an imprecise
approximation of the capitalization rate.
100. For example, in Swanton v. State Guaranty Corp., 42 Del. Ch. 477, 481,
215 A.2d 242, 246 (1965), the price/earings ratio was determined by use of an industrial
analysis conducted by Professor Dewing and contained in his text, THE FINANCIAL
POLICIES OF CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1926). The price/earnings ratio was then adjusted
upward to reflect a strong real estate market together with the company's policy of
buying real estate and holding for a return in the form of capital appreciation. Swanton,
at 244.
101. Price/earnings ratio X Earnings = Price. See supra note 99.
102. Appraisal Statutes, supra note 54, at 1468.
103. It is possible to weight a value by a factor of zero. The court in Applica-
tion of Delaware Racing Assn., 42 Del. Ch. 406, 423-24, 213 A.2d 203, 213 (Del. 1965),
found a 10 percent weight to dividends which amounted to 10 percent of zero. The
court in Delaware Racing cited Adams v. R.C. Williams, 39 Del. Ch. 61, 158 A.2d 797
(1960), where the court found a zero value for earnings and ordered a reappraisal.
Delaware Racing, 213 A.2d at 213, Adams, 39 Del. Ch. at 71, 158 A.2d at 803. The
reappraisal resulted in the appraiser giving a 40 percent weight to the zero earnings
value, which was later affirmed by the Chancellor in an unreported opinion. Delaware
Racing, 213 A.2d at 213.
104. For example, assume the values illustrated by the chart below resulted
from the component analyses. Further, assume the court decided to give both dis-
counted earnings and market value a 25 percent weight and asset value a 50 percent
weight. The result would be illustrated by the chart below.
COMPONENT ANALYSES VALUES WEIGHTS RESULTS
Earnings value $100 25% $ 25
Market value 200 25% 50
Net asset value 300 50% 150
"Fair Value" $225
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the various percentages is not made pursuant to definite guidelines.
The court examines each component analysis and decides its
degree of applicability according to the attendant circumstances. While
the courts have on occasion allowed a certain component to be given
a weight of zero percent, they required consideration of all three
analyses."' 5 In Tri-Continental v. Battye,' the Delaware Supreme Court
required consideration of all relevant factors to determine the fair
value of the minority shareholders' stock. Delaware courts have
interpreted the Tri-Continental requirement to mean that basing a
fair value determination on only one component analysis is improper. 7
Further, the Delaware courts have pointed out that, when using the
Delaware block, the fair value must be the value of the business as
a going concern.0 8 In sum, the Delaware block valuation method was
highly structured in terms of which component analysis must be con-
sidered, but guidelines did not exist for the final weighting process.
Application of the "Delaware Block"
Due to the arbitrary weighting process, the structured Delaware
block valuation method provided less than satisfactory results when
valuing natural resource companies such as timber, paper, or oil
companies." 9 Natural resource companies generally have high levels
of undervalued assets.10 Their assets in the form of natural resources
105. See supra note 103.
106. 31 Del. Ch. 523, 74 A.2d 71 (Del. 1950).
107. In Tri-Continental the court stated that since an actual market value did
not exist, the reconstruction of a market value was permissible but not necessary.
Tri-Continental, 74 A.2d at 74. Further, the Delaware Supreme Court stated, "courts
must take into consideration all factors." Tni-Continental, 74 A.2d at 72. In Applica-
tion of Delaware Racing Assn, 42 Del. Ch. 406, 419, 213 A.2d 203, 211 (Del. 1965),
the court stated that even if an actual market value of the shares did not exist, a
reconstructed market value must be given consideration if a reconstructed market
value is ascertainable. Id. Further, the court in Delaware Racing stating that while
market value is an important element, it must not be the sole consideration. Id.
Liquidation value also cannot be the sole factor used to determine fair value. In re
General Realty & Utilities Corp., 29 Del. Ch. at 497, 52 A.2d at 14 (1947) (The Delaware
court noted that the appraisal should not be comprised of only one factor.); Chicago
-Corp. v. Munds, 20 Del. 142, 155, 172 A. 452, 457 (1931) (Neither market value nor
net asset value can be the sole factor in establishing value within the statutes).
108. The "going concern" requirement is required by the Tri-Continental holding.
The concept of value under the appraisal statute is that "the stockholder is entitled
to be paid for that which has been taken from him, viz., his proportionate interest
in a going concern." Tri-Continental, 74 A.2d at 72. The going concern requirement
has been interpreted to mean that asset or liquidation value alone can not be the
sole determinant of fair value. See infra note 146.
109. See infra text accompanying notes 120-349.
110. In the three cases cited infra note 112, which pertained to natural resource
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have market values higher than the values carried on the companies'
books. The Delaware block's "going concern" concept, which required
consideration of all three component analyses, led to the argument
that asset value in natural resource companies did not receive the
proper weight."'
Three cases illustrate the valuation problem of the Delaware
block method both with regard to natural resource companies and to
breaches of fiduciary duty.' In Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp.,11 fair value
was determined by using an appraisal remedy based on the Delaware
block valuation method."' The plaintiff, however, argued that asset
value was not given adequate weight."5 In Lynch v. Vickers Energy
Corp.,"18 a breach of fiduciary duty case, the court held that an
appraisal remedy, using the Delaware block valuation method was
inadequate to establish satisfactory damages."' Finally, in Weinburger
v. UOP Inc.,"8 another case involving a breach of fiduciary duty, the
court eliminated the Delaware block valuation analysis and held that
a new appraisal concept should be adopted; one that will provide
minority shareholders with an adequate remedy."9
Kirby Exemplifies The Weakness Of The Delaware Block Analysis
In Kirby, minority shareholders were cashed out"' by the 95%
owner, Santa Fe Industries, Inc."' Contemplating the acquisition of
companies, the plaintiffs argued that more weight should be given to the net asset
value, because the net asset value was more reflective of the value of a natural resource
company and was considerable above the offered price. See infra text accompanying
notes 120-349.
111. Id.
112. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333 (Del. Ch. 1981) (found for defen-
dants), rev'd, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 351 A.2d 570
(Del. Ch. 1976) (judgment for defendants), rev'd and remanded, 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1978),
on remand, 402 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1979), affd in part, rev'd and remanded, 429 A.2d
497 (Del. 1981); Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 395 A.2d 730 (Del. Ch. 1978), modified,
413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980) (dealing with a natural resource company).
113. 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980).
114. Id. at 146.
115. Id. at 142.
116. 429 A.2d 497 (Del. 19811.
117. Id.
118. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
119. Id.
120. Cash-out is a term used to signify that the minority shareholders were
forced to sell their stock to the majority shareholder for cash, as in Kirby, 413 A.2d
at 139.
121. Kirby's 5 percent minority shareholders' interest consisted of 25,000 shares.
Kirby, 413 A.2d at 139.
19851
Schlyer: "Fair Value" Determinations in Corporate "Freeze-Outs" and in Sec
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1985
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.19
Kirby's minority shareholders' stock"' under Delaware's short form
merger statute,12 3 Santa Fe commissioned both an appraisal of Kirby's
assets and a market value opinion of Kirby's stock. ' The asset
appraisal valued Kirby's assets at $320,000,000 ($640.00 per share).2 5
The market value opinion of Kirby's stock was $125.00 per share. 26
Based on this data, Santa Fe offered the minority shareholders $150.00
per share." Owners of 5,000 of the 25,000 minority shares dissented
and made a formal demand for a stock appraisal.128 For this reason,
the court appointed an appraiser."
The appraiser, using the Delaware block valuation method, deter-
mined that the minority shareholders' stock was worth $254.00 per
share.' The appraiser determined that the asset value was $456.00
per share 3' and the earnings value was $120.00 per share. 2 The
appraiser then assigned a 40% weight to the asset value ($456.00)
and 600/o weight to the earnings value ($120.00), resulting in the overall
"fair value" of $254.00.' Both Santa Fe and the Kirby minority
shareholders objected to the value found by the court-appointed
appraiser."'
122. Id.
123. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 253, (1973) short form merger statute.
124. The Morgan Stanley company was commissioned to perform a stock value
opinion. Mr. W. Davis was commissioned to conduct an asset appraisal. However, seven
months later, immediately prior to the merger a second asset appraisal was commis-
sioned. Kirby, 413 A.2d at 139.
125. The second asset appraisal subsequently found Kirby's asset value was
$227,754,000 or $456.00 per share. Id. at 147.
126. Id. at 149.
127. Id. at 139.
128. The dissenters, stockholders who did not think the offered price was ade-
quate, demanded an appraisal under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 262 (1973). Kirby, 413 A.2d
at 139. The court did not deal with the fiduciary aspect because it already had been
litigated in federal court. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). The
court held that the fair value, determined by an appraisal remedy, was adequate.
Damages, such as rescissory damages, were not appropriate. The court looked to the
entire fairness of the merger. Kirby, 413 A.2d at 140.
129. Kirby, 413 A.2d at 139.
130. Id. at 140.
131. The appraiser used the value derived from the second asset appraisal,
which valued Kirby's net assets at $277,754,000 or $456.00 per share. Id. at 147.
132. Id. at 140.
133. WEIGHT VALUE
ASSET 40% X $465.00 $182.40
EARNINGS 60% X 120.00 72.00
FAIR VALUE $254.40
134. Id. at 139.
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The minority shareholders argued that the parent corporation
owed a fiduciary duty of entire fairness"5 to the minority
shareholders.13 Therefore, damages should have been awarded in the
amount the shareholders would have received based on an arm's length
transaction.137 Santa Fe argued that such a stock valuation would be
based on the sale or the liquidation of the assets, rather than the
traditional "going concern" standard. 8' However, the shareholders
argued that the only dispute concerned the relative weights placed
on the asset and earnings values.'39 Therefore, the minority
shareholders contended that their value was consistent with the con-
cept of the Delaware block and its "going concern" requirement. '
The Delaware Supreme Court held that Santa Fe, with a 95%
ownership, had virtual control over the Kirby company's operation.""
At Santa Fe's option, it could liquidate the company and give the
shareholders $670.00 per share, the company's net asset value."2 Alter-
natively, Santa Fe could cash out the minority shareholders at the
pre-merger going concern value." Further, the court held that because
there was no market price for the stock, " the relevant factor to
establish the market value was a $3.00 per share dividend, which
would result in a low market value as a going concern, thus making
the Kirby company ripe for a cash out. ' The court held that fair
value should be based on the traditional "going concern" concept and
rejected the minority shareholders' argument that fair value should
approximate the company's asset value. 48
135. For a definition of entire fairness, see infra notes 576 and accompanying
text.
136. Id. at 140. See infra note 576.
137. The result of an arm's length transaction would be closer to the market
value of the assets. Kirby, 413 A.2d at 140.
138. The defendant argued that the "going concern" requirement was established
in Tri-Continental and that damages based on an arm's length value would be an
unwarranted extension of the appraisal remedy. Id.
139. The plaintiff argued that asset value should be given a 90 percent weight
and earnings value a 10 percent weight. Id. at 141.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 140.
142. Id.
143. The court rejected the minority shareholders' claim that this was in effect
a private eminent domain action. The plaintiff argued that a cash-out under the short
form merger statute should be viewed as a forced sale at a distressed price. Id.
144. The only market for Kirby's stock was a tender offer for $65 per share
and occasional sales at $85 to $95 per share. Id. at 141.
.145. Id.
146. The court in Kirby quoted Tri-Continental emphasizing that the stock should
be valued as a "going concern" and that "intrinsic" or "true value" can not be deter-
mined by the exclusive acceptance of only liquidation value. Id. at 141.
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The minority shareholders in Kirby then conformed their
arguments to the traditional standards of the Delaware block. They
argued that the asset value should have been given more weight.'
Secondly, they contended that the five year average earnings figure
used to compute the earnings value did not represent the potential
future earnings because of recent pre-merger changes in Kirby com-
pany's product lines and marketing strategy.'48 On the other hand,
Santa Fe argued that earnings should be given more weight to adjust
for lack of marketability of Kirby's stock.'49
The court observed that there was no rule of thumb for assign-
ing weights to the component analyses.""0 While acknowledging that
asset values can be increased in some instances, the court noted that
the lack of stock marketability in this case offset any reason to
increase the asset value's weight.'' Although the court recognized the
appraiser's concern that a large spread between asset values and
earnings value could result in a bargain for Santa Fe, the court did
not inquire into the problem."' Rather, the court found that the
appraiser's assigned weights adequately compensated for any
disparity.'-
The Delaware Supreme Court, affirming the lower court's finding,
found that the weight the appraiser assigned to the asset level was
satisfactory.' Even though Kirby's main asset, its timberland, was
appreciating in value, was saleable on the open market, and was
capable of generating cash,'55 the lower court had found that future
earnings potential was adequately accounted for through the calculated
earnings value."8 Therefore, based on a concern that earnings value
would be given too much weight, the lower court excluded any asset
147. The plaintiff argued that because Kirby was a natural resource company,
asset value must be given additional weight. Id. at 142.
148. The minority shareholder argued that an earnings value based on a five
year average is inappropriate because growth and appreciation are not adequately
considered. This is true especially, because Kirby's investors looked to capital apprecia-
tion of their stock, rather than dividend income. Id. at 144.
149. Id. at 145.
150. Id. at 143.
151. Id. at 146.
152. Id. at 145.
153. Id. at 145-56.
154. Id. at 146.
155. The court acknowledged that: "The investing and trading public ... give
consideration to corporate assets only insofar as they disclose a capability of generating
earnings .. " Id. at 144 (Gibbons v. Schenley Ind., Inc., 339 A.2d 460 (Del. Ch. 1975).
156. Based on a five year average earnings. Kirby, 413 A.2d at 145.
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value that was based on an earnings analysis.'5 7 Further, the Morgan
Stanley stock value opinion commissioned by Santa Fe reinforced the
notion that the earnings potential had been adequately considered."
Finally, the lower court examined the Davies' asset appraisal,5 ' which
was also commissioned by Santa Fe but supported the minority
shareholders' position. The lower court found that the Davies' asset
appraisal could not be used because it determined Kirby's asset value
on a "going concern"' 6 basis and not on the basis of a "willing
seller/willing buyer"'6 ' which is the proper method for determining
a liquidation price.'6 2
The Kirby court strictly adhered to the traditional "going con-
cern" concept,6 ' and thus to the historical constraints of the Delaware
block valuation.' The court refused to allow asset value to
predominate in the determination of "fair value," primarily because
of the court's definition of the "going concern" requirement.'' In
establishing a stream of earnings for the discounted earnings approach,
the court used the traditional standard of examining the five year
average earnings rather than looking to prospective earnings.' 6 6 This
adherence to the Delaware block structure provided what appeared
to be a realistic "fair value," because it fell between the differing
values which the parties requested.'67 However, the strained applica-
tion of the appraisal remedy based on the Delaware block, as used
157. Id. at 144.
158. The Morgan Stanley opinion compared historical earnings trends and
price/earnings ratios with similar companies. The Morgan Stanley opinion then selected
a 15.2 multiplier and applied it to average earnings. The court agreed with this con-
cept and termed the report as an "orderly and logical deductive process in accordance
with approved methodology." Id. at 147.
159. See supra note 124.
160. The Court, while requiring the overall "fair value" to be based on a "going
concern" value, held that asset value should be based on the liquidation value of the
assets. Kirby, 413 A.2d at 141, 148.
161. The term "willing buyer/willing seller" was meant to indicate an asset
liquidation standard, but the Davies asset appraisal used a going concern standard
to determine asset value. Using the Delaware block method, the going concern stan-
dard is proper for the final determination of fair value, but it is not proper for finding
the net asset value. Id. at 147-48.
162. Id.
163. See supra note 108.
164. Kirby, 413 A.2d at 147-48.
165. See supra note 108.
166. Kirby, 413 A.2d at 147.
167. Kirby company had made offers of $150 per share. Id. at 149. The minority
shareholders desired a value of approximately $600 per share, which was a little less
than the asset value of $670.00 per share. Id. The court appraisal using the traditional
standards found a fair value to be $254.00. Id. at 140.
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in Kirby, provided an inadequate remedy in Lynch v. Vickers Energy
Corp.,168 where the court found a breach of fiduciary duty.
The Inadequacy of The Delaware Block Valuation Method
Under Lynch
When the Delaware block was used in Lynch, the method resulted
in a "fair value" that was less than the purchase price."6 9 The Delaware
Supreme Court in Lynch found that the minority shareholders, who
were damaged by a breach of fiduciary duty,7 ' should not be limited
to the Delaware block valuation method in proving damages. 171
Therefore, the court held that the plaintiff could be awarded a dif-
ferent form of damages.171
The controversy in Lynch resulted from a purchase of the
minority shareholders' stock by the majority shareholder, Vickers
Energy Corporation (Vickers), a wholly owned subsidiary of Esmark
Company. 73 Through a tender offer of $12.00 per share, Vickers was
able to acquire a substantial portion of TransOcean Oil, Inc.
(TransOcean).'74 However, after the transaction, the minority
shareholders discovered that Vickers had failed to disclose certain facts
about the tender offer.' In the complaint, the plaintiff76 alleged that
168. 351 A.2d 570 (Del. Ch. 1976), (Judgment for defendants), rev'd and remanded,
383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1978), on remand, 402 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1979), affd in part, rev'd
and remanded, 429 A.2d 497 (Del. 1981).
169. Lynch, 402 A.2d at 12. The purchase price was $12.00 per share, the "fair
value" of the minority shareholders' stock was found to be $11.85.
170. The breach of fiduciary duty resulted from nondisclosures to the minority
shareholders. See infra note 175.
171. Lynch, 429 A.2d at 500.
172. The Delaware Supreme Court allowed damages to be in the form of the
monetary equivalent to rescission, with the objective of putting the parties in the
position they were in before the transaction. Id. at 501.
173. Id. at 499.
174. Lynch, 402 A.2d 5, 6 n.1 (1979). The Vickers company owned 53.5 percent
of TransOcean's stock before the $12.00 tender offer. After the tender offer Vickers
owned 88 percent of TransOcean's stock.
175. The nondisclosures consisted of the following:
a. An asset appraisal by the company valuing the assets at $250,800,000
was omitted. The company in its September, 1974 offer, stated the value of the assets
to be approximately $200,000,000. Lynch, 351 A.2d at 574.
b. Esmark had authorized purchases of the TransOcean stock for a price
up to $15.00 per share. Id. at 575.
The Delaware Supreme Court found item (a) and (b) to be critical factors. Lynch, 383
A.2d at 280; and 429 A.2d at 499.
176. The plaintiff represented herself and the minority shareholders similarly
[Vo1.19
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 [1985], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss2/6
"FAIR VALUE" DETERMINATION
Vickers had breached its fiduciary duty as a result of the
nondisclosures.'" The Delaware Chancery court rejected the plaintiffs
claim and found for the defendant.' 8
Reversing the chancery court's decision, the Delaware Supreme
Court found that Vickers had breached its fiduciary duty owed to the
minority shareholders."9 Although the supreme court resolved the
liability issue, it remanded the damages issue.'" On remand, the
chancery court examined three alternative remedies.'81 The plaintiff
argued that she should have been able to choose the alternative
remedy that gave her and the members of her class the greatest
recovery.' 8 In contrast, Vickers argued that the plaintiff did not suf-
fer any injury resulting from a material omission in the proxy state-
ment and therefore was not entitled to recovery.'" The chancery court,
after examining the three possible remedies, found that though the
defendant had breached its fiduciary duty,'84 the breach did not cause
injury to the plaintiff.'85
The chancery court noted that the only fiduciary duty breached
was the duty of complete candor.'88 When dealing with the minority
shareholders, the majority shareholders owe a duty of "entire fairness"
to the minority shareholders.'87 Since the Delaware Supreme Court
had already decided that the information withheld from the minority
shareholders might have affected their individual valuation of Trans-
Ocean's stock, the chancery court was only to determine an adequate
remedy to be accorded the plaintiff." To determine the appropriate
situated. Lynch, 402 A.2d at 6.
177. The chancery court did not find a breach of fiduciary duty, Lynch, 351
A.2d at 575-76, but the supreme court reversed the chancellor's finding that a reasonable
man could use the information not disclosed to value the stock, and found that Esmark,
controlling the majority, had a fiduciary duty to disclose this information to the minority
shareholders. Lynch, 383 A.2d at 281.
178. Lynch, 351 A.2d at 575-76.
179. Lynch, 383 A.2d at 281.
180. Id.
181. Lynch, 402 A.2d at 11, 12.
182. Id. at 7.
183. Id.
184. Further the chancery court did not find fraud or intentional misrepresen-
tation. Id. at 10.
185. Id. at 13.
186. "Vickers as the majority shareholder of TransOcean, owed a fiduciary duty
to the plaintiff, which required complete candor." Lynch, 383 A.2d at 279.
187. Lynch, 402 A.2d at 8.
188. Id. at 9.
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remedy, the chancery court examined Poole v. N.V. Deli Maatchappi,"89
a case involving a greater degree of unfairness than in Lynch.9 '
In Poole, the court found that the defendant had made fraudulent
misrepresentations upon which the plaintiffs had relied and sold their
stock at an inadequate price.' The Lynch chancery court noted that
even in Poole, where fraudulent misrepresentation occurred, the court
looked to the "going concern" standard and applied the structured
Delaware block valuation method in determining the "intrinsic" or "fair
value" of the stock.9 ' Therefore, the Lynch chancery court deduced
that if the Delaware block was an adequate remedy in a case involv-
ing fraud, it was also adequate in a case involving mere breach of
a fiduciary duty. 19 3
The plaintiff in Lynch then conformed his argument to the con-
text of the traditional appraisal remedy.' He argued that the oil
industry was an asset-wasting industry whose value should be based
primarily on the value of its major assets, generally oil reserves. 9'
The chancery court held that the facts in Lynch were analogous to
the facts in Kirby, which also involved a natural resource company.'
The Kirby court applied the appraisal remedy based on the Delaware
block analysis.'97 Although in Kirby the asset value was an important
element in finding the fair value, the Lynch chancery court held that
in applying the Delaware block valuation, asset value cannot be the
sole determinant of fair value. 99
After applying the Delaware block method of appraisal, the
chancery court determined that the "fair value" was less than the
offered price of $12.00 per share.'99 In deriving the fair value, the
chancery court based the asset value component on an asset appraisal
189. Poole v. N.V. Maatchappij, 43 Del. Ch. 283, 224 A.2d 260 (Del. 1966).
190. Lynch, 402 A.2d at 10.
191. Id.
192. The Poole court would not allow "fair value" to be determined exclusively
by the company's net asset value. The court required a Delaware block weighting
of market value, earnings value, and asset value. Lynch, 402 A.2d at 9.
193. Id. at 10.
194. Id.
195. Id. An asset wasting industry is one which consumes or sells its non-
replenishable resources, primarily minerals.
196. Id.
197. Kirby, 413 A.2d at 146.
198. Lynch, 402 A.2d at 11, 12.
199. Id. at 12.
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report2'" commissioned by the defendant.0 ' The market value compo-
nent was based on TransOcean's stock market price two days before
the offer.2 The earnings value component was based on the tradi-
tional five year average earnings, which was then multiplied by 17.4,
the figure found to be the appropriate earnings multiplier. 3 The court
then weighed the values derived from the component analyses.0 '
In determining the proper weight for the asset value component,
the Lynch court considered the Kirby court's analysis. 5 Because both
Kirby Lumber Company and TransOcean were natural resource com-
panies, the Lynch court applied the same 40% weight to asset value
that was applied by the Kirby court. Market value was also given
a 40% weight and earning value was given a 20% weight.0 6 The
resultant fair value was found to be $11.85 per share, a value less
than the $12.00 per share offered.2 7 Therefore, the lower court found
the plaintiff was not damaged by the defendant's omission of material
factors.200 Since the plaintiff could not show any out-of-pocket loss,
200
the chancery court examined the alternative remedy of rescission.
The chancery court held that even if the plaintiffs were entitled
to equitable rescission, which would amount to a return of their stock,
they would have to pay the defendant, Vickers, $12.00 per share plus
reasonable interest of 13.1% or a total price per share of $19.64.211
However, the market value of Vickers' stock as of the 1978 judgment
200. Id. at 8.
201. This report was one of the items not disclosed to the minority shareholders.
Id.
202. Id. at 11.
203. Id. at 12.
204.
COMPONENT ANALYSIS VALUES WEIGHTS RESULTS
Asset Value $17.50 40% $ 7.00
Market Value 9.48 40% 3.80
Earnings Value 5.25 20% 1.05
Fair Value = $11.85
Id. at 12.
205. Id. at 10.
206. See supra note 204.
207. Lynch, 429 A.2d at 499.
208. The court in Lynch held that the plaintiffs were not damaged by the con-
duct of the defendant. Lynch, 402 A.2d at 13.
209. The Lynch court quoted Poole, "Plaintiffs seek to recover the difference
between the actual value of the stock and the price paid, known as the 'out-of-pocket'
measure of damages. ... Poole, 224 A.2d at 262, cited in Lynch, 429 A.2d at 500.
210. Lynch, 402 A.2d at 12. Further, the court found that a "prudent investor"
can get 13.1 percent on his investment..Id. at 12.
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date was approximately $14.31,"' which was below the $19.64 per share
level. 12 Consequently, the chancery court found that the plaintiff and
members of her class would not benefit from an award of rescissory
damages, and thus they were not damaged as a result of any omis-
sion made in the tender offer circular.213
Lynch's Second Appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court
The plaintiff appealed for a second time to the Delaware Supreme
Court. The supreme court, after considering the issue of damages,
reversed the chancery court's decision."4 The court first examined the
applicability of the appraisal as propounded by the court in Poole.1'
Distinguishing Poole, the supreme court noted that the court in Poole
applied the Delaware block appraisal, which the plaintiffs had
specifically requested." However, the plaintiff in Lynch did not ask
for the same appraisal formula that was applied in Poole.217
In determining whether the appraisal remedy was adequate, the
supreme court found that greater weight should be given to Trans-
Ocean's asset value and less weight to TransOcean's market value.
The Lynch supreme court recognized that TransOcean was a natural
resource company whose major asset, oil reserves, was in high demand
and scarce supply. 8 Further, Vickers' dominion, control, and
announced plan to acquire 100% of TransOcean, had adversely
influenced the price of TransOcean's stockY9 Thus, the court held that
TransOcean's stock price should not have been given a 40% weight
in determining TransOcean's intrinsic value.' Consequently, in Lynch,
the supreme court found the structured Delaware block appraisal
211. The price was determined by the following weighting:
COMPONENT ANALYSIS VALUES WEIGHTS RESULTS
ASSET VALUE $14.31 50% $ 7.16
MARKET VALUE 15.06 30% 4.52
EARNINGS VALUE 13.41 20% 2.68
"Fair Value" $14.36
This is a chart representation of the data used to determine market value. Id.
at 13. (NOTE $.06 DISCREPANCY IN THE COURT'S CALCULATION)
212. Id. at 12-13.
213. Id. at 13.
214. Lynch, 429 A.2d at 507.
215. Id. at 499.
216. Id. at 501; Poole, 224 A.2d at 262.
217. Lynch, 429 A.2d at 501.
218. Id. at 505.
219. Id. at 504.
220. Id. at 505.
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remedy did not adequately compensate the plaintiff for her loss. 1 Fur-
ther, the court held that the statutory limitation of appraisal does
not apply in cases of breach of fiduciary duty. 2 Instead, the court
found other remedies such as rescission, or its monetary equivalent,
were applicable in such cases.'
The state supreme court did not order actual rescission because
of the lapse of time since the transaction had occurred," 4 but stated
that the monetary equivalent of rescission should be awarded.' 5 Since
the purpose of rescission is to place the parties where they were
before the transaction,' the monetary equivalent to rescission equals
the gain in value Vickers received as a result of acquiring and holding
TransOcean's stock.' Therefore, the supreme court held that the plain-
tiffs were entitled to receive from the defendant the equivalent value
of TransOcean's stock as of the time of the judgment, less the $12.00
per share already received plus fair interest. 8 The supreme court
then established broad guidelines for determining the monetary
equivalent of rescission.2
221. Id. at 507.
222. In finding breach of fiduciary duty, the Delaware Supreme Court did not
require an actual intent to deceive when one party has an advantageous bargaining
position with respect to the other party. Id at 503. However, in Poole, breach of fiduciary
duty was neither alleged or found. Id. at 501. A strange result since fraud should
also be a breach of a fiduciary duty.
223. Id. at 501.
224. The supreme court stated that rescission would be preferable if at an
earlier stage, but was not possible at this late date because of the corporate changes
that had taken place in Esmark. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 501, 502.
228. The rescissory damages should be measured at the time of the judgment.
Id. at 503. The defendant is entitled to a credit equalling the $12.00 already paid plus
the interest equivalent to what they could have "safely earned" by use of the $12.00.
The supreme court overruled the court of chancery, which allowed a 13.1/o rate. The
supreme court stated that a 70/0 rate would be more fair. The intent is not to reward
the wrongdoer. Id. at 506.
229. The supreme court stated the stock should not be valued at less than
$15.00 per share or more than $41.40 per share. The lower limit was established by
the undisclosed information that Vickers was willing to buy TransOcean's stock from
anyone for $15.00 per share in September, 1974. The supreme court reasoned that
an arm's length transaction with the minority shareholders should not have resulted
in a price less than $15.00 per share. In addition, the supreme court set the high limit
on the basis that $41.40 per share is the most value the plaintiff ever alleged Trans-
Ocean's stock was worth. Id. at 505.
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In conclusion, the supreme court held that if the majority
shareholder breaches its fiduciary duty when dealing with the minority
shareholders for the purchase of their stock, the minority shareholders
are entitled to rescission or its monetary equivalent. ° Although the
appraisal remedy was appropriate in Kirby,23 the concept of fairness
requires rescission or its monetary equivalent when the court finds
a breach of fiduciary duty. 32 Therefore, the use of the structured
Delaware block method to determine fair value did not provide
adequate relief to the minority shareholders, in this instance."
After Lynch, the traditional Delaware block method of valuation
still existed for standard appraisals of dissenting shareholders' equity,
as in Kirby. However, the traditional appraisal remedy, which uses
the Delaware block method, was found inadequate in cases involving
a breach of fiduciary duty.2" The Delaware Supreme Court's
dissatisfaction with the Delaware block appraisal method reached its
peak in 1983, when it eliminated the traditional Delaware block valua-
tion method. 5 In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,236 the Delaware Supreme
Court made the valuation process more flexible, appropriate, and
justifiable."7
The New Appraisal Remedy Adopted In Weinberger
The controversy in Weinberger involved both the value of a
natural resource company's stock and a breach of fiduciary duty. 8
Therefore, the facts in Weinberger are analogous to both Kirby and
to Lynch.' In 1975, Signal Companies, Inc. ("Signal"), the defendant,
was looking for additional investments because it had just sold a
wholly owned oil subsidiary for $420,000,000 in cash.24 0 After examin-
230. Id. at 501.
231. See supra note 128. No breach of fiduciary duty was found in Kirby.
232. Lynch, 429 A.2d at 501.
233. Id.
234. See supra note 128.
235. See infra text accompanying notes 238-349.
236. 426 A.2d 1333 (Del. Ch. 1981) (found for defendants), rev'd, 457 A.2d 701
(Del. 1983).
237. See infra text accompanying notes 333-49.
238. UOP was a diversified oil company traded on the New York Stock
Exchange. Weinberger, 426 A.2d at 1335. Further, the Delaware Supreme Court found
a breach of fiduciary duty. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703.
239. Because UOP was a natural resource company, the facts in Weinberger
are analogous to both Kirby and Lynch. However, breach of fiduciary duty was only
found in Lynch, thus the facts in Weinberger and Lynch are the most analogous.
240. Weinberger, 426 A.2d at 1336, 1337.
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ing Universal Oil Products ("UOP"), Signal began friendly negotiations
in 1975 with the hope of acquiring the controlling interest in UOP."
The negotiations began with Signal offering $19.00 per share and
UOP asking $25.00 per share. Arm's length bargaining resulted in a
price of $21.00. Pursuant to the final agreement, a tender offer for
a limited number of shares242 was made to obtain UOP's controlling
interest. Because more than the desired number of outstanding shares
were offered," Signal became the majority shareholder, owning 50.5%
ownership of UOP's stock.244
After becoming the majority shareholder, Signal made board
appointments.2"5 Signal initially appointed only six of the thirteen
directors.246 However, when the president and chief executive officer
retired in 1975, Signal appointed a replacement, Mr. Crawford, giv-
ing Signal control of the board.24 ' Simultaneously, Signal, still with
excess cash, was searching unsuccessfully for additional investments.248
After researching the market for other possible acquisitions,
Signal decided its best investment opportunity was to purchase the
balance of UOP's stock.4 Therefore, in February, 1978, Signal decided
to explore the feasibility of this course of action."' Pursuant to this
decision, Signal's management ordered a feasibility study to be per-
formed by two of Signal's vice presidents. 1 That study indicated that
a purchase price of up to $24.00 per share would provide an acceptable
return for Signal. '52
Based on the information derived from the feasibility study,
Signal's management decided to offer UOP's minority shareholders
241. The purpose of the negotiations was to purchase both issued and unissued
stock, giving Signal 50.5% ownership. Id. at 1336.
242. Signal only needed 5,800,000 shares to obtain the desired 50.5% controlling
interest. The negotiated agreement to buy 1,500,000 unissued shares at $21.00 per
share was contingent upon a successful tender offerof 4,300,000 issued shares at $21.00
per share. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 704.
243. The number of outstanding shares tendered to Signal totaled 7,800,000,
representing 78.2% of the total outstanding shares. Weinberger, 426 A.2d at 1336.
244. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 704.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 705.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
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$20 to $21 per share for their stock." Signal then contacted Crawford
and made the proposal. While Crawford did suggest some modifica-
tion with respect to the employee benefits, he did not object to the
offered price.215 Later Crawford suggested that in order to convince
the minority board members to vote in favor of the cash out, Signal
should offer $21.00 per share, which was still within the proposed
range and was the price of the over subscribed tender offer. 21 Conse-
quently, Crawford and Signal's management both thought the $21.00
per share price was fair, and would be approved by the minority board
members."7 This conclusion was based in part on the over subscrip-
tion of the 1975 tender offer.2
Signal's management, believing UOP's minority shareholders
would accept their offer, authorized negotiations with UOP's direc-
tors, and on February 28, 1978, issued a press release. The press
release announced that negotiations were to begin for the purchase
by Signal of UOP's 49.5% minority ownership."9 At that time, UOP's
stock was selling for $14.50 per share.6 Two days later, on March
2, 1978, Signal issued another press release stating that its offering
price was in the range of $20 to $21 per share.2 11 In order to validate
the fairness of Signal's offer, Crawford started negotiating with an
investment banking firm to provide a fairness opinion. 62
Crawford retained Lehman Brothers, an investment banking firm,
to do the fairness study.2 Crawford chose this firm for three stated
reasons. First, Lehman Brothers had been UOP's investment banker
for years.6 Second, Mr. Glanville, a partner in Lehman Brothers, was
also a director of UOP.265 Third, Crawford thought time was of the
essence and realized that Glanville's present knowledge of UOP's
operations would expedite the analysis..26 After negotiating the price
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. More than the desired amount of stock was tendered. Id. at 706. See also
supra notes 242, 243.
257. Id. at 705, 706.
258. Id. at 705. See also supra notes 242, 243.
259. Id. at 706.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Mr. Crawford was told by Signal's management that time was of an essence.
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for the fairness opinion, Glanville accepted the assignment. Crawford
and Glanville then discussed the value of UOP's stock.6 7
During the same discussions, Glanville indicated that $20 to $21
per share for UOP's stock was a fair value because it represented
a 500/0 premium over the market pricey.26 Believing time was of the
essence, Lehman Brothers used three analysts who completed the
fairness opinion in only three days. 269 By analyzing public information
and interviewing Crawford, Lehman Brothers' team concluded that
either $20.00 or $21.00 per share was a fair price.' Although it became
apparent that the opinion was not needed as urgently as anticipated,
Lehman Brothers performed no further analysis. 2 ' The results of the
fairness opinion were given to the board members who represented
the minority shareholders.' However, Signal never disclosed the hasty
manner in which the study was completed.273
Based on the information provided, the UOP board members who
were not affiliated with Signal voted to accept the offered price of
$21.00 per share. 24 However, the non-affiliated board members voted
without knowledge of either the manner in which the fairness opinion
was conducted, or the existence of the prior study conducted by
Signal's management, which indicated that $24.00 per share was a fair
price and was still profitable for Signal.275 The plaintiff, representing
all the minority shareholders who did not exchange their stock for
the merger price, attacked the validity of the merger seeking to either
set the merger aside or to be compensated monetarily." The chancery
court found for the defendant, Signal; the plaintiff appealed. 7
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed.278 The supreme court
found that Signal had breached its fiduciary duty by not disclosing
to the non-Signal board members either the manner in which Lehman
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 707.
271. A board meeting was convened on March 6, 1978, but the merger was
not submitted to UOP's shareholders until their annual meeting May 26, 1978. Id. at
707, 708.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 708.
274. Id. at 707.
275. Id. at 707-09.
276. Weinberger, 426 A.2d at 1335.
277. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703.
278. Id. at 715.
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Brothers' fairness opinion was performed or the prior study indicating
that $24 per share was still a fair price." 9 The first study, performed
internally by Signal's management, indicated that Signal should pur-
chase the remaining stock of UOP for a price between $21 and $24
per share."8 The analysis indicated that Signal was projecting a return
on investment of 15.7% if the stock was purchased for $21 per share
and a 15.5% return if purchased for $24 per share. 8 ' The difference
between $21 and $24 per share amounted to a $17,000,000 impact on
the minority shareholders.282 The Delaware Supreme Court indicated
that because the .2% difference in the rate of return on investment
was very small in relationship to the aggregate difference of
$17,000,000, the information should have been given to the non-Signal
board members.2" Therefore, the directors affiliated with Signal, who
owed a fiduciary responsibility to the minority directors, breached
this duty by not disclosing the earlier study which indicated that $24
per share would be a fair price."'
The Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger held that the direc-
tors affiliated with Signal and UOP had both dual capacities and dual
responsibilities, 285 and thus should have treated the minority
shareholders in a fair manner. 88 Further, the court held that the con-
cept of fairness should be viewed as involving two components: "fairdealing and fair price. ' The Signal affiliated directors had access
to inside information which they did not disclose to the minority
directors.2" Neither the study that was prepared for the exclusive
use of Signal's directors, nor the circumstances surrounding Lehman
Brothers' fairness analysis was disclosed to UOP's minority directors.'
Therefore, the majority directors were not "dealing fairly" with the
minority directors.211
279. "Given these particulars and the Delaware law on the subject, the record
does not establish that this transaction satisfies any reasonable concept of fair dealing
Id. at 712.
280. Id. at 709.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 712.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 710.
286. "When directors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a trans-
action, they are required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous
inherent fairness of the bargain." Id.
287. Id. at 711.
288. The inside information refers to the in-house study conducted by Signal's
management. Id.
289. Id. at 712.
290. See supra note 279.
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The second component of the "fairness" standard is fair price."
Price fairness relates to the "fair value" of UOP's stock.' In deter-
mining the "fair value," the supreme court found that the chancery
court had erroneously used an analysis, propounded by the defendant's
analyst, which applied the concepts of the traditional Delaware block
valuation method." The market value component was determined by
looking at the five year market performance of UOP's stock. 4 Dur-
ing the five calendar year period from 1974 through 1978, the highest
price at which UOP's stock was traded was $18.75 per share in 1974."
The average market price was slightly less than $14.00 per share."6
Finally, the current closing market price on February 28, 1978, was
$14.50 per share.97 Therefore, based on any criteria, the market value
was less than the $21.00 per share offering price.
After analyzing the market value of the stock, the defendant's
analyst examined the firm's earnings value."' 8 Looking at this compo-
nent, the analyst noted that, due to the "nature of UOP's business,"
its earnings were both erratic and unpredictable. 9 The analyst deter-
mined the appropriate earnings multiplier by examining comparable
companies."0 The resulting range of values, from $14.31 per share to
$16.39 per share, was substantially below the $21.00 per share offer-
ing price.31
Signal's analyst then turned to the asset value component.3 02
Although the analysis of the asset value resulted in the highest value,
the value was still less than the offering price of $21.00.30 The analyst
291. Id. at 711.
292. The Delaware Supreme Court stated that fair price includes . . . all
relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and any other elements
that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company's stock." Id.
293. Id. at 712.
294. Weinberger, 426 A.2d at 1364.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 1365.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Further, UOP's dividend policy was erratic with the 1978 first quarter
dividend equal to the 1970 level. Id. However, it should be noted that accepted economic
theory views diversification as a stabilizing force on earnings.
300. The analyst selected comparable companies and found their earnings values
were between 6.5 and 7.0 times that of UOP's 1977 earnings per share and between
80% to 85% of UOP's 1977 book value. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. "The net asset value or book value was $19.86 at year-end, 1977, and $20.69
as of the end of the first quarter of 1978." Id.
19851
Schlyer: "Fair Value" Determinations in Corporate "Freeze-Outs" and in Sec
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1985
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
equated asset value with book value and concluded that the asset value
should be given very little weight because Signal was acquiring UOP
as a going concern with no intention of liquidation2"'
Finally, Signal's analyst departed from the traditional Delaware
block analysis by examining the premium paid over the market price
of comparable acquisition transactions. 5 In examining the premium
paid over the market price of comparable firms, the analyst again
concluded that the offered price was fair."° The chancery court held
that this type of analysis proffered by the defendant's analyst was
more in line with the traditional Delaware block method than the
analysis propounded by the plaintiffs analyst2°7
The plaintiff argued that at the time of the merger UOP's stock
had a fair value of $26.00 per share. °8 His expert, Mr. Bodenstein,
used two techniques to prove the stock's value. 09 First, he compared
the premium paid over market price in ten other tender-offer merger
combinations of similar size. 1 Secondly, he computed the fair value
for UOP's stock based on a discounted cash flow approach."' Both
analyses were based on the principle that fair value equals the value
derived from owning 100% of an ongoing company. 12 The 1000/a owner
would be free from constraint"' and could do with the company as
he pleased. 14 The 100% owner could maximize his wealth by chang-
ing the company's dividend policy, its investments, its overall risk,
or even by liquidating its assets. 15 Neither of Bodenstein's analytical
methods conformed to the established principles of the Delaware block
valuation.1
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. He found that the median premium was 41% and the average (mean)
premium was 48%. Comparing the market price of $14.50 (on February 28, 1978) and
the offered price of $21.00, the resulting 44.8% premium was deemed a fair premium
to pay for the acquisition of UOP's minority interest. Id.
307. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712, 713.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Weinberger, 426 A.2d at 1359.
313. See infra text accompanying notes 449-51, 473-75.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. As seen in Kirby and prior cases, the objective of the Delaware block
valuation method is to determine fair value based on a "going concern" prior to the
merger. See supra text accompanying notes 120-67.
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The plaintiff's first approach determined that based on the
premium in ten comparable transactions, the premium paid for UOP's
stock should have been between 70% and 80%, with the median at
74%.3' By applying these percentages to UOP's stock price on
February 28, 1978, he concluded that the fair value of UOP's stock
should have been in the range of $25.65 to $27.30 per share. 18 The
discounted cash flow analysis also resulted in comparable values.
Bodenstein's discounted cash flow analysis determined the fair
value to be between $25.21 and $30.59 per share.319 The basic concept
of this approach equates fair value to the sum of the net present values
of cash generated from operations and from excess liquidity.' The
first step in this method is to determine the excess liquidity and dis-
count the excess liquidity to present value.4'
In order to perform this first step, the company's assets were
examined and any excess liquidity was assumed to be drained or
reinvested in efficient investments.' The resultant cash flows from
the elimination of the excess liquidity, or the return from the new,
more efficient investments, was then discounted to present value.3
Next, the cash flow from operations was determined and then dis-
counted to its net present value.' The fair market value was the
sum of the cash flows' net present values.3 This figure, however, was
not an exact calculation due to the imprecise determination of both the
cash flows and the discount rate.2 6
The chancellor rejected both the cash flow determination and
the determination of the discount rate.' The court noted that a small
change in the discount rate would make a large difference in the
resulting value.' Further, the lower court held that neither the con-
cept that the fair value is equal to the value of 100% ownership nor
317. Weinberger, 426 A.2d at 1357.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 1358.
320. Excess liquidity as defined by Mr. Bodenstein is "the working capital that
is not required to generate the earnings of the business from its operation." Id. at 1357.
321. Id.
322. Part of the excess liquidity hypothesized to be drained was the value of
the unused timberlands. The analyst hypothesized that the timberland was sold and
considered the funds generated cash. Id. at 1358.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 1358, 1359.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 1359.
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the concept that the fair value is equal to projected discounted cash
flows was the established law in Delaware.'
The chancellor, abiding by precedent, ruled that the proper
method in valuations was the "Delaware Block" method which had
been accepted since 1947.1 Therefore, since the defendant's analysis
was both logical and more closely resembled the concepts of the
Delaware block method, the chancellor relied on the defendant's
analysis and rejected the plaintiffs analysis. 1 However, the Delaware
Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the chancery court. 32
The Delaware Supreme Court ruled that the "Delaware Block"
method was outdated and that the time had come for the acceptance
of modern valuing techniques using accepted financial theories.' The
supreme court held that, with the narrow exception that an increase
in value resulting solely from the contemplation of a merger cannot
be considered in determining fair value,' all other "elements of future
value, including the nature of the enterprise, which are known or
susceptible of proof as of the date of the merger and not the product
of speculation, may be considered." 5 Further, a fair price requires
consideration of all relevant variables.' The court noted that the new
valuation concept would be more widely used and flexible, as well
as reflective of the intent of the Delaware corporation statutes. 7
The Weinberger court held that a more liberal approach to valu-
ing minority interest must be taken so as to reflect the spirit of
Delaware's statutory provisions regulating corporations.338 The
329. The chancellor wrote, "I do not find this approach to correspond with
either logic or the existing law." Id. at 1360.
330. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 715.
333. Id. at 712, 713.
334. Id. at 713.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. The following quote illustrates Delaware's concern for fairness and flex-
ibility, but is void of guidelines: "In view of the fairness test which has long been
applicable .... [T]he expanded appraisal remedy [is] now available to shareholders, and
the broad discretion of the Chancellor to fashion such relief as the facts of a given
case may dictate . . . " Id. at 715. "[T]he Chancellor's discretion, the monetary award,
if any, should be in the format of monetary damages, based upon on entire fairness
standards, i.e., fair dealing and fair price." Id. at 714.
338. After 1981, the term "fair value" was repeatedly emphasized in 8 Del.
Code S 262. "Clearly, there is a legislative intent to fully compensate the shareholders
for whatever their loss may be, subject only to the narrow limitation that one cannot
[Vol.19
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 [1985], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss2/6
"FAIR VALUE" DETERMINATION
legislative history of sections 262(f) and 262(h) of the Delaware Code
place increased emphasis on determining the "fair value" of the
minority shareholders' interest.39 The legislative intent is to "fully
compensate shareholders for whatever their loss may be, subject to
the narrow limitation that one cannot take speculative effects of the
merger into account."' O Therefore, the court found that the analysis
of the type offered by the plaintiffs analyst must be considered in
determining fair value." Declaring that the determination of fair value
using the structured Delaware block method is no longer the law in
Delaware, 2 the court stated that more flexible techniques must be
used to determine fair value.
The Delaware Supreme Court, by allowing more flexible deter-
minations of fair value, held that damages based on complete monetary
rescission were probably not necessary in Weinberger.' But, the court
did not preclude consideration of "elements" of rescissory damages
if the chancellor determined that they were appropriate." Although
the supreme court found a breach of fiduciary duty as it had in Lynch,
the court found that the expanded concept of fair value determina-
tion makes appraisal an adequate remedy. 5 On remand, the plaintiff
would be able to test the fairness of the $21.00 offer by considering
all of the relevant factors." No longer are the plaintiffs arguments
constrained by the Delaware block valuation method. 7 In summary,
the appraisal remedy, as expounded in Weinberger, expanded both the
use of modern financial analysis"5 to determine "fair value" and the
take speculative effects of the merger into account." Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714.
339. The old sections of the Delaware Code title 8 S 262 (f) & (h) merely used
the term "value" when referring to the objective of the appraisal remedy. However,
the sections were changed to state that the objective of the appraisal remedy was
to find the "fair value" of the minority shareholders' interest. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 712, 713.
343. Id. at 714.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 714, 715.
348. The court noted:
We believe that a more liberal approach must include proof of value by
any techniques or methods which are generally considered acceptable in
the financial community and otherwise admissible in court, subject only
to our interpretation.
Id. at 712.
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concept of "going concern" to include consideration of the value of
100% company ownership.- 9
SECTION II-VALUATION THEORIES
The Weinberger court allowed the use of modern financial analysis
to determine the "fair value" of a minority shareholder interest in
freeze-out situations.m This section will explore some modern valua-
tion techniques that are relevant to finding the "fair value" of minority
shareholder interests. This note then examines the range of possible
arm's length values where the "fair value" of minority interests might
lie. 1 The determination of various "values" is a function of economic
theory.
As "positive" micro-economic theory purports," one purpose of
financial theory is to find the relationships and relative effects of real
world variables.' One such relationship is the effect of dividend policy,
earnings, cash flow, information, and numerous other factors on the
market price of stock." If the world consisted of only two variables,
the process would be merely to change one variable and observe the
impact on the other. However, in order to determine these relative
relationships in a world with many variables, it is necessary to hold
constant some variables, while other variables are being tested.' One
method of accomplishing this makes use of several assumptions.
Financial theory is based on assumptions that are necessary both
in its development and operation.' As the various theories were
developed, they have increased in sophistication by incorporating more
variables.' 7 However, as a model becomes more complex, its ability
349. Id. at 714.
350. See supra note 348.
351. See infra text accompanying notes 424-84.
352. For a good discussion of law and economics see: Strasser, Bard, and Arthur,
A Reader's Guide to the Uses and Limits of Economics Analysis with Emphasis on Cor-
porate Law, 33 Mercer LAW REV. 571 (1982). The article describes the concepts of positive
and normative economics. [hereinafter cited as Strasser].
353. J. MAO, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL DECISIONS 12 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Mao. Variables may be classified in two broad categories: exogenous
variables, those given by the decision maker; and endogenous variables, whose value
is determined by the model.
354. Smidt, A New Look at the Random Walk Hypothesis, 3 THE JOURNAL OF
FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 235 (Sept. 1968). [hereinafter cited as Smidt].
355. Strasser, supra note 352, at 576.
356. Id.
357. The complexity of a mathematical model is limited, among other things,
by the number of variables, given the number of equations. C. FRANK JR., STATISTICS
AND ECONOMETRICS 317 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Frank).
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to portray the relationships between its component variables becomes
weakened because of the effects of the interdependence of the
variables. This lessens the model's usefulness in predicting the changes
in its variables. Therefore, in order to be useful, every economic or
financial model must retain a degree of simplicity.3" No single model
or theory can be used to explain all real world variable relationships.
Consequently, every financial theory and resultant model used to
predict the reaction of a number of variables by varying others must
contain certain assumptions, which hold some of the variables at a
constant level. In short, even with respect to the widely accepted
efficient market hypothesis, assumptions are necessary."
Efficient Market Approach
The efficient market hypothesis' main postulate is that given an
array of complex assumptions, the market price of a security is equal
to, or nearly equal to, its intrinsic value." ° The market price might
not reflect the intrinsic value, but the price does reflect all past events
and available information."" Therefore, if the efficient market
hypothesis is valid, a security's market price will at least be a good
358. Strasser, supra note 352, at 576.
359. Fama, Random. Walks in Stock Market Prices, 21 FINANCIAL ANALYST
JOURNAL 55 (Sept.-Oct. 1965) [hereinafter cited as Fama 1965].
360. Professor Fama divided the efficient market hypothesis into three opera-
tional categories. The divisions were based on the amount of information investors
use to evaluate the value of a security. These categories are:
(a) Weak form efficiency: For this, the lowest level of the efficient market
hypothesis, to be valid the hypothesis assumes that most investors utilize historical
price and financial data to value the securities. Therefore, no investor can make ex-
cess returns by using historical data.
(b) Semi-strong efficiency: This level requires the assumption that investors
use all publicly available financial information to value securities. Therefore, no in-
vestor can make excess profits by using any publicly available information.
(c) Strong form efficiency: This form requires that investors know all informa-
tion, both public and inside, which they use to value security prices. Therefore, an
investor cannot make excess returns even using inside information.
Fama's theory as in most empirical studies, does not contend that the strong
form efficiency describes the real world. The strong form is merely an extreme yard-
stick to measure the degree of efficiency that might exist in a capital market. Fama,
Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 THE JOURNAL
OF FINANCE. No. 2, 383 (May 1970) [hereinafter cited as Fama 1970].
However considerable empirical support does exist for both the weak and semi-
strong form of the efficient market hypothesis. Fischel, Eficient Capital Market Theory,
the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX.
L. REV. 1, 3 n.9 (1978).
361. Fama (1965), supra note 359, at 56.
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estimate of its intrinsic value.2 Further, the market price will vary
randomly around this intrinsic value."
Professor Fama developed the "random walks" hypothesis; a
theory that attempts to explain random movements of stock prices.'
The random movement around the intrinsic value of the stock results
from the market participants' different notions of the stock's intrinsic
value." Due to the large number of market participants over-valuing
and under-valuing the stock, their bidding will cause the stock's price
to vary around its intrinsic value . 3 1 However, to reach this conclu-
sion certain assumptions are necessary.
First, the primary premise in the random walk theory is that
the stock market is efficient. An efficient market exists when a large
number of rational profit maximizers with free access to information
concerning both the firm and outside factors attempt to predict the
future market values of the firm's stock. 7 Contained in this defini-
tion are four assumptions:
362. Id. at 59.
363. Id. at 56.
364. Id. at 56-59.
365. Id. at 56.
366. Id.
367. There are assumptions required in various degrees for each level of the
efficient market hypothesis. However, as the assumptions are relaxed, the market,
by definition, will be less efficient. Varying degrees of market efficiency can be
illustrated by first allowing all investors access to all relevant information about the
company, both public and inside information. Each investor, assuming he is economically
rational, will form similar notions of risks and returns. Since risk is still present even
if all investors calculated identical risk parameters, they still might lose money by
purchasing the firm's security.
The analysis does not require seeing into the future. For the efficient market
hypothesis to be valid, it only requires that the investors have access to information.
The information must be relevant to determining the potential returns and the firm's
risk. While a few investors might value the firm extremely high or low, the bidding
for the purchase of the securities will cause the securities price to vary around its
intrinsic value. Further, most securities are held by institutional investors who, with
the same information available, will probably reach similar notions of risks and returns.
If investors perceived only slight variances in risks and returns from an invest-
ment, each investor's expected value of the firm would be similar. However, the
investors' perceived values would show more variance, if their perception of the
investment's risks and returns were different. This might be the result of allowing
some investors complete access to relevant information, while withholding informa-
tion from other investors.
The investor with access to more relevant information could make better
judgments as to the firm's potential returns and risk than the investors without such
information. Therefore, as the information is released to the other investors, they also
will perceive similar risks and returns, reflecting their notions of the firm's value.
[Vol.19
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1. Market participants are rational profit maximizers. 68
2. Market participants are numerous." 9
3. The market participants have perfect or near perfect
knowledge."'
4. Market competition will both instantaneously cause new
information to be known and affect the intrinsic value of the stock,
which is reflected in this market price. 7' In summary, the implication
of the efficient market theory is that the stock prices are the best
estimators of the intrinsic value of the stock. If the "random walk"
theory372 is valid and the market is efficient, the market price of a
stock is a good estimate of its intrinsic value. 73 However, if informa-
tion not available to the market participants was not discounted by
the market, the stock's price might not be a good estimate of the
stock's intrinsic value. 4
Discounted Cash Flow-Investment Opportunities Approach
The efficient market hypothesis, at least in its weak and semi-
strong form, 7' is generally accepted by the financial community.'
For a good discussion on economics of information see: Hirshleifer and Riley, The
Analytics of Uncertainty and Information-an Expository Survey, THE JOURNAL OF
ECONOMIC LITERATURE 1375 (Dec. 1979).
Further, empirical analysis shows that above average "gross returns" can be
made with the use of information not available to the general market. However, while
gross returns can be increased with additional information, the cost of the informa-
tion offsets the increase. Therefore, the empirical results are consistent with both
the weak and the semi-strong efficient market hypothesis. See Cornell and Roll, Strategies
for Pairwise Competition in Markets and Organizations, THE BELL JOURNAL OF
ECONOMICS 201-13 (Spr. 1981) (Shows that the individual using costly information will out
perform the market, but only in terms of gross returns.)
368. This is the traditional assumption of economic analysis. Strasser, supra
note 352, at 581-85.
369. See supra note 367.
370. Id.
371. Fama, Fisher, Jenson, Roll, The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Infor-
mation, 10 International Economics Review No. 1, 1-21 (Feb. 1969).
372. Fama (1965), supra note 359, at 58.
373. This is consistent with all three levels of the efficient market hypothesis.
374. See supra note 367.
375. See supra notes 359, 360.
376. The efficient market hypothesis was considered bizarre by many in 1960,
"but by 1970, it was generally accepted by academicians and by many financial
institutions." J. Lorie and R. Brealey, MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTMENT
MANAGEMENT 101 (1972).
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However, even among analysts who accept the efficient market model,
its application is limited to situations where a public market price
is available. 77 Therefore, in the case of closely held companies or in
situations where the efficient market model is not applicable, 37 s the
analyst might use the discounted cash flow method of firm valuation.7
The discounted cash flow method is another alternative to valu-
ing a firm or asset as a going concern.3 ' The model consists of the
summation of cash flows projected over a period of time discounted
back to present value. 1 The model's major premise is that the value
of a firm is derived from its ability to generate a return to the investor
over a period of time.3 12 The cash flows can be in the form of either
dividends, earnings, or net cash flows.' These cash flows are pro-
377. The efficient market method would not be applicable where there is a
disparity of information. If an analyst were trying to determine the value of a firm
to someone with undisclosed inside information, he must look somewhere other than
the security's market price. Since the stock market price would not reflect the unknown
information, the stock market price would not reflect the value to the insider. The
same lack of information occurs with respect to closely held companies, only on a broader
scale.
In the case of privately held firms, the discounted cash flow basis can be viewed
as an approximation of the market value. The analysis requires the investor to calculate
the potential return generated by the firm as well as the risks of the returns
materializing. See supra note 367.
378. See supra note 377.
379. This type of analysis is theoretically performed by a large number of
investors with respect to publicly held companies. Their resultant values determine
the market price of the security. Fama (1965), supra note 359.
380. Investors making investment decisions concerning the acquisition of
business assets undergo the same type of analysis. The economic value of an asset
is based on its ability to generate a return. Even jurisdictions using the Delaware
block valuation method, valued leased property on the basis of the lease payments.
Sporborg v. City Speciality Stores, 35 Del. Ch. 560, 123 A.2d 121 (1956).
However, the Delaware court in Francis I. duPont & Co. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344, 352 (Del. Ch. 1973), citing Poole, did not allow the market
value of fully amortized films to be determined by discounting the film's projected
income. See also infra note 383.
381. Mathematically the model is the same as the discounted earnings approach
used in the traditional analysis. The major difference between the Delaware block
concept of discounted earning value is not the theory; the difference is in determining
the component parts. Mao, supra note 353, at 464-93.
382. This was one of the approaches used by the plaintiff in Weinberger. See
supra text accompanying notes 319-26.
383. Early cash flow methods valued the firm using either dividends or net
earnings. The dividend model's premise is that the investor's perception of the firm's
value is a result of the firm's ability to pay dividends. The investor perceives a cur-
rent income stream, rather than capital appreciation as the primary way to realize
income. This argument is countered by the analysts who advocate the net earnings
method.
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jected over the life of the investment.' At the termination of the
investor's holding period, the firm's market value is the summation
The net earning advocates point out that capital appreciation is a significant
portion of an investor's expected return. As a result of the income tax structure,
dividends are not necessarily the optimum method of maximizing shareholder's wealth.
The firm's earnings are first taxed on the corporate level. Then the dividends are
again taxed as ordinary income to the investor. However, if the investor obtains his
income by selling a portion of his stock, he incurs some transaction costs, but he might
be able to receive a reduced income tax rate through capital gains. Further, by allow-
ing the corporation to retain earnings, the net earnings can be reinvested and com-
pounded with payment of only one income tax. The significance of retained earnings
reinvestment becomes more pronounced as the investor's tax rate becomes larger.
Most investors in public markets are financial institutions, banks, trust com-
panies, insurance companies, etc., thus their marginal tax is forty-six percent. For ex-
ample, if the corporation has a pre-tax earnings of $100 and a marginal tax rate of
forty-six percent, the after-tax balance left for reinvestment or the payment of dividends
is $54. If the corporation can receive 10 percent on its investments, the $54 invest-
ment would return $5.40 in the first period, which if retained would increase the value
of the firm. Now if the $54 is paid to a stockholder also with a 50 percent marginal
tax rate only $26.00 is left for reinvestment by the stockholder. Therefore, for the
stockholder to receive a return equal to $5.40, he must have investment opportunities
returning 21 percent. An investment returning 21 percent will probably have con-
siderably more risk than one returning 10 percent.
Even if the investor has better investment opportunities than the company, he
can maximize his return by selling his stock to reinvest in the more profitable endeavors.
With proper tax planning, the investor would benefit from capital gains, resulting in
reinvestment of a larger gross amount. This line of argument supports the theory
that investors value a firm by analyzing the firm's expected net earnings, rather than
the firm's dividend payout. See Bhattacharya, Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy
and 'The Bird in the Hand' Fallacy, BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 259-70 (Spring 1979.
Bhattacharya developed a model, which explains why in spite of the tax disadvantage
firms pay dividends. The reason for a dividend payout is the favorable signaling effect
investors perceive.
However, the net-earnings analysis is not without problems. Net earnings are
the result of accounting conventions, which not only can be changed but also might
contain non-cash charges. Cash flow analysis considers changes in accounting conven-
tions that have no effect on the firm's disposable cash. By changing accounting con-
ventions, such as the method of inventory accounting or the rate of depreciation,
reported net earnings may be changed. Unless the tax records are also changed, there
would be no real change to disposable cash.
Two empirical studies show that investors are not misled by changes in account-
ing conventions. These studies indicate that discounting net cash flows are appropriate.
Therefore, cash flow analysis is merely the normalizing of net earnings for changes
in accounting conventions that do not affect disposable cash. Kaplan and Roll, Investor
Evaluation of Accounting Information: Some Empirical Evidence, JOURNAL OF BUSINESS
225-57 (April 1972). Kaplan and Roll examined two types of accounting changes which
increased earnings per share, but had no effect on cash flows. The results indicated
that investors look beyond the effect on earnings per share to the effect on cash flows.
384. The life of the investment is not the same as the investor's holding period.
Rather, the investment life refers to the period of time the investment generates cash,
which could be longer than the investor's holding period.
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of the remaining discounted cash flows, the value at which the in-
vestor could then dispose of his investment. 85 To initiate the cash
flow analysis, projecting the cash flows is required.
Cash flow projections may be based on historical data."' But a
better way to project cash flows is by means of the investment
opportunities approach, which examines the firm's capacity to generate
cash.37 Using this approach, the projected cash flows should be derived
from three sources: first, the current cash flows generated by the
firm's present investments;... second, the cash flows generated from
the firm's expected present and future investment opportunities;389
third, in the case of excess liquidity, excess cash can be considered
the same as generated cash.9 The cash flows are then discounted
by an interest rate reflecting both the time value of money (risk free
rate), and the risk related to the firm's ability to generate the pro-
jected stream of cash flows. 91
The risk free portion of the discount rate is similar to the price
385. Mathematically, the cash flow model is similar to the earnings model.
The equation would be: V = E CF/(1 + O n
V=Value of company.
n = number of periods.
r=discount rate reflecting: (1) time of value money, (2) uncertainty related
to the projected cash flows.
CF=projected cash flows.
If the investor sold at the end of year (period) #2, the value of the firm at the
time of sale would be equal to the projected stream of cash flows starting with the
next period, i.e. year #3.
386. The Delaware block method generally used an average of the firm's
preceding five years earnings to determine the projected earnings used in the dis-
counted earnings approach. Delaware Racing, 213 A.2d at 212. Lynch, 402 A.2d at 12.
See also supra note 97.
387. The firm's record of past cash generations might be indicative of future
performance, but this should not be assumed without examination. The analyst should
explain the basis for the past and expected future cash flows. Questions to be con-
sidered are: What projects and factors allowed the firm to generate its past cash flow?
Are the same projects continuing to generate these cash flows, or will the existing
projects require a substantial increase in capital reinvestment to maintain past levels
of cash flows? Are new or different cash-generating projects being planned? This type
of analysis, together with a statistical analysis of the past record adjusted for future
expectations, should provide a more realistic approximation of the firm's future
performance.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. The plaintiff in Weinberger used the excess cash as an element of his cash
flow projection. This is not inconsistent when finding the value of 100 percent owner-
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a consumer demands to forego current consumption."' By foregoing
present consumption he is entitled to increased consumption in the
future. 3 The price of foregoing current consumption has been referred
to as the risk free rate or time value of money. 9' This risk free rate
might be approximated by the rate of short term government
securities."3 The portion reflecting the firm's business risk is more
difficult to estimate.
The second portion of the discount rate must reflect the firm's
business risk."' When the portion of the discount rate reflecting the
firm's business risk is added to the first portion, the risk free rate,
the sum equals the firm's cost of equity capital. 9 ' The cost of equity
ship. The 100 percent owner could drain off any excess liquidity to maximize his wealth.
The discount rate, which is the sum of the risk free rate and the rate reflecting
the firm's risk is equal to the company's cost of equity.. The cost of equity is the return
a reasonable investor would expect to receive for investing in a venture given its
risk. Mao, supra note 353, at 466. See also infra note 396.
392. Even in a world of certainty, a person would rather receive money today
than a promise to receive the money in the future. Therefore, money received today
is more valuable than money received at a later date.
393. T. Copeland and J. Weston, FINANCIAL THEORY AND CORPORATE POLICY,
115-18 (2nd ed. 1983) (hereinafter cited as Copeland).
394. Id. at 116.
395. Even United States government securities, which have virtually no default
risk, are susceptible to interest rate risk. For instance, hypothesize an investor who
purchases U.S. government bonds paying 10 percent. But before maturity the effec-
tive yield on similar bonds increases. The investor will not be able to sell his bonds
unless he discounts their price to the extent that the purchaser will receive the new
higher market yield. Therefore, although default risk is minimal, the interest rate risk
can be substantial with long-term securities. So to approximate the risk free rate, the
yield of very short-term government securities such as 90-day treasury bills should
be used.
396. The concept of total firm risk is generally subdivided into two categories;
systematic and unsystematic risk. Systematic risk is the risk of the market. If an
investor held and equal investment in every market security, his return would fluc-
tuate as the market return fluctuates. This fluctuation of return is caused by systematic
risk. However, a single firm or an investor who holds less than a full market portfolio
will also experience unsystematic risk. Unsystematic risk reflects the particular
characteristics of the firm.
A firm's unsystematic risk reflects on the firm's ability to generate revenues
and to control expenditures. The level of unsystematic risk is, among other things,
a function of the firm's efficiency and its level of fixed expenses, both operational
and financial. Unsystematic risk can be reduced by diversification. An investor who
owns a equal share of all market securities only encounters systematic risk. He does
not encounter unsystematic risk. Therefore, the more securities held by an investor,
the less unsystematic risk he will encounter. But systematic risk will still remain.
For a good discussion of systematic risk see Copeland, supra note 393, at 191-94.
397. Id.
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can also be viewed as the rate an investor requires for an equity in-
vestment in the firm, given the firm's level of risk.398 Assuming in-
vestors are risk adverse, if the investor felt firm A was more risky
than firm B, he would require a greater return from firm A to com-
pensate him for accepting the additional risk.3
The following factors are generally believed to result in an
increase or decrease in the perception of the firm's business risk."'
The investor views the volatility of the firm's cash flows as an in-
dicator of the firm's business risk level." 1 That is, an investor will
require a chance for a higher return if more uncertainty is associated
with the return. Therefore, a firm that has highly volatile cash flows
must show more potential for gain to maintain its value than a firm
with stable cash flows."0 2 Anything that affects the variance of the
firm's earnings will be detrimental to the firm's value, unless the in-
crease is associated with a proportional increase in the firm's expected
return."3
The firm's debt level is one such factor that can increase the
volatility of the firm's earnings without decreasing the firm's value.0 4
Increased debt level has the effect of increasing the fixed costs of
the firm. As fixed expenses are increased, whether from operations
or from financing requirements, the firm's cash flows become more
volatile given a change in sales volume." 5 However, within limits, the
398. See supra notes 391, 396.
399. Most economic analysis assumes investors are risk adverse. The risk
adverse investor prefers certainty and will pay for certain investments by accepting
lower expected returns. The magnitude of an investor's risk adverse trait will vary,
and can best be measured by utility theory. For example, an investor might have
more disutility from losing $3.00, than positive utility from gaining or winning $5.00
in a game of coin toss. Therefore, to induce him to buy a chance to win, to play the
game, the prize must be increased or the possible loss decreased. Copeland, supra
note 393, at 84-92.
400. See supra note 396.
401. Empirical evidence indicates that increasing the dividend payout might
act as a favorable signal to stockholders and investors about the firm's risk. See Ross,
"The Determination of Financial Structure" The Incentive Signaling Approach, BELL
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 23-40 (Spring 1977) (hereinafter cited as Ross).
402. Id.
403. Although debt increases the firm's risk by increasing the level of the firm's
fixed cost, the market views an increase in debt as a positive signal. Assuming the
firm is not close to cash insolvency, the market generally perceives that the increase
in risk from an increase in the debt level is offset by the potential increase in cash
flows. However, an adverse signal regarding the firm's risk might result from increas-
ing both debt levels and dividend levels. See Ross, supra note 401.
404. Id.
405. Id.
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increase in risk is offset by a perceived increase in investment oppor-
tunities. Therefore, an increase in the firm's debt level can result in
an increase in the firm's value.0 The problem then is that given the
firm's debt structure, past earnings performance, and future invest-
ment expectations, the financial analyst must develop both projected
cash flows and an appropriate discount rate.
The analyst has at least a few analytical methods at his disposal.
First, the analyst might use the firm's past performances along with
annual reports and projections to predict the future cash flows. ' While
most empirical evidence now shows that past cash flows alone are
not good indicators of future cash flows,' historical data might indicate
the firm's risk performance." Unless the firm has recently changed
its risk parameters, the appropriate discount rate may be determined
from the historical data.
Second, the projections derived directly from the firm's plans,
if available, might provide a good basis for projecting future cash
flows.410 They will at least indicate the cash flows the firm is planning
to generate. Further, the projections would indicate the type of
investments contemplated by the firm, which would indicate the
investment's risk, and therefore the firm's risk.4"
The accuracy of the cash flow projection is accounted for in the
discount rate.412 To determine the appropriate discount rate, the
analyst might examine other firms with similar product lines, similar
investments, or similar volatility of earnings."' Therefore, industrial
classification or pseudo-industrial classification can provide forms with
similar risk parameters that could be used to determine the
appropriate discount rate.44 Once the projected cash flows are
established and the appropriate discount rate is determined, the result
406. Id.
407. For a good example see Copeland, supra note 393, at 526-31.
408. Id.
409. Elton and Gruber, Improved Forecasting Through the Design of Homogeneous
Groups, 44 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS I, 75 (Oct. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Elton]. This article
describes procedures for estimating each of the variables which play a role in stock
valuations using earnings. See also Alers, SEM: A Security Evaluation Model, reprinted
in E. ELTON AND M. GRUBER. SECURITY EVALUATION AND PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS 227 (1972).
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. See supra note 391.
413. See Elton, supra note 409.
414. See Elton, supra note 409.
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is the value of the company under the discounted cash flow method. '15
The tangible asset analysis is a valuation approach less theoretical
than the discounted cash flow analysis.
Tangible Asset Analysis
The concept of tangible asset analysis states that the firm's value
is equal to the sum of its net tangible asset values."8 Tangible asset
analysis can be divided into two categories: (1) tangible book value417
and (2) liquidation value. ' Tangible book value is almost universally
found to be a totally inappropriate method of valuing a firm.4"9 Assets
on the firm's books amy be drastically over or under stated.4 0 The
market value of assets such as patents, natural resources, real estate,
and physical assets, are especially susceptible to wide divergence from
the book value. Even if an asset's market value is accurately por-
trayed by its book value, book value never includes the cost of
disposal.
Liquidation value, or net asset market value, examines each
major asset and determines what it can be sold for on the market.
Therefore, the asset value analysis is equivalent to the sum of the
net market values of the firm's liabilities and assets.4" If large blocks
of land or assets exist, the disposal cost must be factored into the
analysis. The major drawbacks to this type of analysis are its expense
and time consumption.4" However, net asset value can accurately por-
tray the minimum "fair value" of 100 percent ownership in a "going
concern."
4
415. After the elements of the model are determined, the final step is the
mathematical calculation. See supra note 385.
416. Net tangible asset value is the net of the tangible assets' market value,
less liabilities. Intangible assets such as goodwill are not included in the calculation.
417. Book value is the value of the assets as shown on the company's books.
418. Liquidation or market value is the value that net assets have on the open
market, i.e. the price a willing buyer and a willing seller under no compulsion to buy
or sell would pay for the assets.
419. Investors value assets by looking to the cash flows which the assets are
capable of producing, not the book value, which results from a variety of accounting
principles. See supra note 155.
420. Because book value is typically on a cost basis, it is related to the length
of time the asset has been held, which might not be relevant to the asset's market
value. This is true because depreciation or appreciation schedules are generally
unrealistic.
421. Once the component values and liabilities are found, the process becomes
merely arithmetic balancing.
422. Appraisals of assets such as land, equipment, and inventory are both time
consuming and expensive.
423. See infra text accompanying notes 473-75.
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SECTION III-EXPANDED FAIR VALUE CONCEPT
In order to decide which valuation theory is most useful with
respect to a given set of facts, the question of what is "fair value"
must first be considered. Is fair value the value to a minority
shareholder before the merger; the "going concern" concept of the
Delaware block as in Kirby? Or, is fair value the value of 100 percent
ownership in the company, as the plaintiff argued in Weinberger? The
Delaware Supreme Court in Lynch resorted to a remedy other than
appraisal.4 The bounds of the rescissory remedy used in Lynch are
greater than the traditional "going concern" constraints of the
Delaware block.
4 25
Although the Delaware Supreme Court in Lynch chose rescissory
damages, the later Weinberger decision, also involving a breach of
fiduciary duty, did not use the rescissory damages approach." Rather,
the Weinberger court looked to a middle ground in the form of an
expanded valuation remedy, which contains elements of rescissory
damages. Therefore, in expanding the appraisal remedy, the Delaware
Supreme Court not only allowed the use of modern valuation techni-
ques, but also expanded the traditional definition of "going concern"
value to encompass consideration of the value of 100 percent
ownership." This section will first examine the possible arm's length
"going concern values," which after Weinberger may now be considered
in freeze-out "fair value" determinations." This section will then ex-
amine some methods used to determine the various possible arm's
length values, using the types of financial analyses previously
discussed."
The Range Of Possible Arms Length Values
As previously detailed, the Weinberger decision not only expanded
the appraisal remedy to include modern valuation techniques, but also
expanded the concept of "going concern" value. 4 ' The Delaware
Supreme Court in Weinberger placed the burden of proving fairness
on the party breaching the fiduciary duty, because the majority's direc-
tors were not dealing with the minority directors at arm's length.431
424. The Delaware Supreme Court in Lynch resorted to rescissory damages.
See supra text accompanying notes 214-37.
425. Id.
426. See supra text accompanying notes 333-49.
427. See supra text accompanying notes 238-349.
428. See infra text accomapanying notes 430-55.
429. See infra text accompanying notes 456-84.
430. See supra text accompanying notes 333-49.
431. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703.
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The court's holding arguably expands the fair value concept, where
breach of fiduciary duty is found, from the narrow "going concern"
value, the value of the minority ownership, to any value in the range
of possible arm's length values supportable by modern financial
analysis.' The plaintiff in Weinberger argued that the fair value should
be the value based on 100 percent company ownership.' The Delaware
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could test the fairness of the
offered price against the value representing 100 percent company
ownership.4"
Under the Weinberger analysis, the fair value could equal the
value to a 100 percent owner in cases where a breach of fiduciary
duty is found. However, the 100 percent ownership value is but one
value which could result from an arm's length acquisition of a minority
shareholder interest.' Therefore, an examination of the possible values
resulting from an arm's length transaction is appropriate. To facilitate
this analysis, four levels of value, spanning the range of possible arm's
length values, will be considered. Ranging from a low value to a high
value, the four values considered are: (1) the value of a minority
interest,"' (2) the value of a controlling interest,437 (3) the value of a
100 percent owner,4 and (4) the value to an acquirer. 39
Value Of A Minority Interest (The Lowest Value Considered)
The value of a minority ownership interest in a company is the
lowest value on the spectrum of possible arms length values
considered. 4 The minority owner's value is derived from his propor-
tional share in the cash flows, which might result from both dividends
482. Id. at 712-15.
433. Weinberger, 426 A.2d 1359.
434. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714.
435. Conceivably, an infinite number of possible arm's length values can result
between the value limits of each party. However, the maximum arm's length value
would be the value to the buyer. Likewise, the lowest arm's length value would be
the value to the seller.
436. Since this note is concerned only with the purchase of the stock from
the minority shareholders, the value to the minority shareholder, who is the seller,
is the lowest possible arm's length negotiated value.
437. This note will illustrate that the value of the controlling interest is higher
than the value of a minority interest.
438. The value of 100 percent ownership was the value argued for by the plain-
tiff in Weinberger. This section will point out where the value to a 100 percent owner
lies on the spectrum of arm's length values.
439. Due to the possibility of synergy, the value to the acquirer, or buyer,
is the highest possible arm's length negotiated value.
440. The value of a minority interest in a going concern was the objective
of the Delaware block valuation method. See supra note 108.
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and value appreciation of the company." However, the minority owner
is at the mercy of management's ability and policies. " 2 On occasion
the minority owner will not agree with management's policies or effi-
ciency, in which case his most viable alternative is to sell his stock."'
However, the market in which he sells his stock, will be aware of
the firm's level of management efficiency.' Therefore, the arm's length
value of a minority interest will reflect the potential buyer's limited
control over both management's decision making ability and manage-
ment's level of efficiency. Further, the value of the minority's equity
is the lowest possible arm's length transaction value, because the
minority owner does not have any control over the company other than
his ability to organize other investors in order to achieve a controlling
block.
Value of Controlling Interest
The value of the controlling interest is greater than the value
of a minority owner, because of the controlling interest's power to
change management. While the minority owner generally must accept
management's decisions, the controlling interest can force management
to change undesired policies, or can simply change management."5 The
value of control is derived from the potential of improving manage-
ment efficiency, thus increasing the value of the company. However,
the controlling interest still has limits.
The controlling shareholder, through his directors, owes certain
fiduciary responsibilities to the minority shareholders."6 For example,
441. See supra text accompanying notes 375-415.
442. H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 95 (2d ed. 1970) (hereinafter cited as Henn).
443. Although this area is beyond the scope of this note, the writer recognizes
that special veto provisions, giving the minority shareholder more authority, exist in
corporations. However, the general rule in public corporations is that of majority
shareholder rule. Id. at 358-405, 525.
444. Unless a new investor in the same security has additional stock, or con-
trol of additional stock, his voting, and therefore control over the corporation, is on
the same level as the previous shareholder. Id.
445. The controlling interest is limited in a number of ways. These include,
for example, when meetings can be called, certain fiduciary duties, etc. However, for
the purpose of this note, it is sufficient to point out that the controlling interest has
the authority to effectuate a management change, which makes his ownership interest
more valuable than a minority shareholder's interest. For limits on control see Henn,
supra note 442.
446. Lynch, 402 A.2d at 7 (Directors representing the controlling shareholder
failed to disclose material facts concerning a tender offer); Weinberger, 457 A.2d at
703 (The majority shareholder was cashing out the minority shareholders, but failed
to disclose relevant information to the directors representing the minority shareholders).
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the controlling shareholder cannot expropriate funds and assets from
the company for his own interest."7 If the controlling shareholder has
investments in other companies, he must be careful not to divert
business or otherwise take advantage of his dual position with both
companies at the expense of the minority owners."" Consequently, the
controlling owner, while having more power and value than the
minority owner, is not free to exercise unlimited discretion as is the
100 percent owner.
Value of 100 Percent Owner
Absent any restriction from debt covenants, the 100 percent
owner is free to do with a company as he pleases."9 If the 100 per-
cent owner owns more than one economic entity, he does not have
to be concerned with a conflict of interest with respect to any minority
ownership. The 100 percent owner has complete and ultimate control
of the company.4" He can liquidate the company, pay dividends, pass
through tax savings, retain the earnings sheltered by a lower cor-
porate tax, maximize his wealth, or give the company away. The value
of 100 percent company ownership is therefore greater than the value
of the controlling interest." ' Although the value of 100 percent owner-
ship is greater than the value of controlling interest, the highest
possible value might be the value to the acquirer.
Value to the Acquirer
A particular shareholder might have a special use for 100 per-
cent ownership of a company which both enhances the value of his
present firm, or economic entity, and the value of the acquired firm.42
447. Id.
448. Henn, supra note 442, at 457.
449. The 100 percent owner does not owe a fiduciary duty to any other equity
member. However, he may owe some duties to debt holders via loan covenants.
450. Id.
451. How much more valuable 100 percent ownership is than controlling interest
depends upon the individual attributes of the parties. The value of the controlling
interest and 100 percent ownership could be very close if the shareholder would not
greatly benefit from 100 percent ownership. See infra note 453.
452. This increase in value could be the result of factors such as:
1. Economies of scale in management, operations, accounting, etc,
2. Monopolistic profits, either vertical or horizontal,
3. Replacement of inefficient management,
4. Tax considerations,
5. Undervalued company -asymmetrical information,
6. Reduction of unsystematic risk through diversification.
Copeland, supra note 393, at 561-69.
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The increase in value to both entities is commonly referred to as
synergy.4" As a result of synergy, the value of a firm can be more
than the value to a 100 percent owner. For example, assume the value
of firm A is equal to $100, and the value of firm B is equal to $50.
If the firms merge to form firm C, its value without synergy will
be $150. However, if the resulting value of firm C is equal to $200,
the transaction resulted in the creation of synergy equal to $50. The
preceding example could result if, for instance, firms A and B were
the only two firms in a particular industry. Therefore, by merging
into one firm, C, they will enjoy monopoly profits, which will increase
C's value in excess of the individual values of the component firms,
A and B. The value of firm B is only $50 to any firm in another
industry, but due to the possibility of monopoly profits, firm A con-
siders the value of firm B greater than $50. Consequently to a par-
ticular acquiring company, the value of a company might be greater
than the value to a 100 percent owner due to the effect of synergy.
453. Cox, Acquisitions and Mergers, 1 CORP. L. REv. 48 (1978).
The Cox article examines Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 485-572. More specifically, the article considers the application of Brudney
and Chirelstein's valuation of the minority stock's "fair value" in Mills. The article
states that synergy is found in most mergers, but more often in conglomerate mergers
rather than horizontal or vertical mergers. Cox notes that there are many more reasons
why intra-industry mergers should result in a synergy value. These reasons include
the following: economies of scale, operating efficiency, market expansion, monopolistic
power, administrative and managerial efficiencies, and complementing operations in
areas such such as technology, marketing, and research.
Cox notes that there is a major source of synergy in conglomerate mergers
called financial synergy which includes: "instantaneous synergy," "latent debt capacity,"
"defensive diversification," or "bargain purchase."
(1) "Instantaneous synergy" Cox defines as an increase in the con-
glomerage's earnings per share, accompanied by an increase in the con-
glomerate's "price-earnings" ratio.
(2) "Latent debt capacity" Cox defines as an increase in the conglomerate's
debt capacity resulting from merging with a firm that has a lower debt
to equity ratio.
(3) "Defensive diversification" is defined as the stablizing of the con-
glomerage's earnings fluctuations, which generally are considered an
indicator of the conglomerate's risk. The more volatile the conglomerate's
earnings the more risk, therefore, the more return it must provide to
maintain or increase its price. Such diversification not only increases income
but also reduces risk.
(4) "Bargain purchase" is defined as buying the firm for less than what
it is worth. Cox discounts this theory. He assumes the market is efficient
with perfect information and adequate breadth. Therefore, any "bargain"
would probably be bid out of existence.
The final aspect to his article restates the finding in Mills, which holds that
the proper procedure to find fair value is to first find the synergy value, and then
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In sum, the spectrum of possible values that can result from arm's
length negotiations between companies contemplating a merger range
from the low value, the value of a minority interest, to the high value,
the value to the acquiring firm. 4 The analyst and the lawyer must
know how to determine these four values through the use of the finan-
cial valuation techniques previously discussed.'"
SECTION IV-DETERMINING POSSIBLE
VALUES RESULTING FROM ARM'S LENGTH NEGOTIATIONS
Determining The Value Of A Minority Interest
The value to a minority shareholder reflects both the minority
shareholder's right to a proportional share in the firm's present and
expected future profits and the minority shareholder's lack of control
over the decisions of management."' In the case of publicly traded
companies, this value is directly reflected in each company's market
price.'57 Most economists would apply the efficient market hypothesis
in this case.'- The efficient market hypothesis states that given the
information available to the minority shareholder, the market price
reflects the risks and returns of minority ownership.' However, the
market price might not reflect undisclosed information relevant to the
firm's future expected profits.'"
If a court found that management owed a duty to disclose this
relevant information, a discounted cash flow approach could be used
to establish the value of the information."' The value of the informa-
tion would then be added to the market price to establish the value
of the minority ownership.'" To determine the components of the dis-
counted cash flow analysis, the best source would be the actual plans
of management.'" However, if the actual plans are not available, the
divide it between the interests on a proportional basis. He considers this to be a "fair
allocation," but states that the proportional division of the synergy value may depend
in part on why the synergy came about.
454. See supra note 435.
455. See supra text accompanying notes 350-425.
456. See supra notes 443-45.
457. See supra text accompanying notes 360-74.
458. See supra text accompanying notes 360-74.
459. See supra text accompanying notes 360-74.
460. See supra note 367.
461. See supra text accompanying notes 375-415.
462. In effect the market price is adjusted as if the information were disclosed.
463. The plaintiff in Weinberger used UOP's five year business plan to project
cash flows. Weinberger, 426 A.2d at 1362.
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analyst could look to similar projects or product lines implemented
by other companies.'64 The comparison to other firms which
implemented similar projects would also determine the appropriate
discount rate.' 5 Therefore, with both components, the expected cash
flows and the discount rate, the value of the undisclosed information
can be determined.
By multiplying the value of the undisclosed information by the
percentage of equity owned by the minority shareholder, the propor-
tional distribution is determined. 6 The minority owner is entitled to
a proportional interest in the return of the net expected cash flows'6
adjusted for the project's risk. After the proportional value of the
undisclosed information is determined, it should be added to the
market price.4 " The result is an approximation of the market value
of the minority shareholder's interest after the undisclosed informa-
tion becomes public. Moreover, this adjusted value should be the
minimum value in an arm's length negotiation. 9 As stated above the
value of a minority interest reflects the minority shareholders' lack
of control over management. Of course, if a shareholder can control
management, the value of his stock would be enhanced.
Determining The Value Of Controlling Interest
The value of the controlling interest is difficult to quantify
through financial analysis. For instance, if the investment opportunities
approach was used, an analysis of all the company's possible invest-
ment opportunities would be required.7 ' Since the controlling interest
can change both the direction of investments and the level of risk,
a cash flow analysis would have to consider virtually every known
investment opportunity.
However, for the situations examined in this note, the problem
464. Elton, supra note 409, at 78.
465. Id.
466. This step is necessary to give the minority shareholder his proportional
share of the value of the undisclosed information. See supra note 367.
467. Net expected cash flows equals the projected returns minus the projected
cash invested and minus projected expenses to be encountered.
468. See supra note 367. Also this assumes the market has not already dis-
counted the undisclosed information.
469. See supra text accompanying notes 440-44.
470. Since the owner of the controlling interest can change the direction of
the company, the analysis would have to relate to how he proposes to change the
company. The projected risks and returns relating to such a change, or a comparison
of the industry, would be appropriate. See Elton supra note 409, at 78.
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of valuing the controlling interest through financial analysis does not
arise. This note considers only instances where the controlling interest
is already purchased by the majority shareholder. Therefore, an ap-
proximation of controlling interest value might be the actual cost to
the majority shareholder.47' However, for the purposes of this note
it is enough to point out the relative value of the controlling interest.
The value of the controlling interest is greater than the value of a
minority interest, but less than the value of 100 percent ownership.472
Determining The Value Of 100 Percent Ownership
The value of 100 percent ownership depends on the efficiency
of the 100 percent owner or his management, but at a minimum it
is the net market value of the firm's assets. 3 If the 100 percent owner
or his management is highly efficient, the market price of the com-
pany's equity would be more than the net market value of the firm's
assets.4 However, the 100 percent owner might manage the company's
assets less efficiently than other firms. In this case, the market value
of his 100 percent interest becomes the net market value of the firm's
assets. 75 Consequently, without evaluating the efficiency of manage-
ment, the minimum value of a 100 percent ownership is the net market
value of the firm's assets less its liabilities. Further, the value of 100
percent ownership is the maximum value resulting solely from the
attributes of the firm. Any value above the value of the 100 percent
ownership results from the expected synergistic value to the acquirer.
Determining The Value To The Acquirer
Since the value to the acquirer is the result of expected synergy,
its dollar amount is a function of the factors causing the synergy. 7"
471. Brudney and Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers,
88 HARV. L. REV. 297 (Dec. 1974) (hereinafter cited as Brudney).
472. See supra text accompanying notes 445-48.
473. The 100 percent owner can increase management efficiency or simply sell
the company's assets. The market values of the assets are based on their ability to
generate cash. Therefore by selling the assets, the 100 percent owner is accepting
the general efficiency of the market's management.
474. If the 100 percent owner can increase the management of his firm to a
level greater than the market efficiency, the market value of his company as a "going
concern" will be greater than the market value of the firm's net asset value.
475. See supra note 473. Also the assets might have an operating synergy;
thus the market value of the assets would be greater if they are sold as a block,
rather than individually.
476. See supra notes 452, 453.
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The value of the expected synergy can be approximated by looking
to the reason for the acquisition. '77 Usually the determination of the
value to the acquirer is not necessary, unless the court perceives "fair
value" as including the complete benefit of the bargain.7
In summary, the Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger opened
up a range of possible values for consideration as the fair value. '79
The Weinberger court held that, where a breach of fiduciary duty was
found, the plaintiff would be allowed to test the fairness of the offered
price against the 100 percent ownership value.4" Further, at the discre-
tion of the chancellor, the court could consider elements of rescissory
damages.48 Delaware has recognized that arm's length negotiations
could result in a value equivalent to the value of a 100 percent
owner.482 Consequently, the Delaware Supreme Court does not preclude
the use of the value to a 100 percent owner in determining "fair
value."9 " State freeze-out actions are not the only situations which
require finding "fair value." The issue of finding "fair value" has also
been an essential element of civil actions involving violations of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 4"'
SECTION V-THE LIMITED FEDERAL APPROACH USED
To DETERMINE "FAIR VALUE"
The issue of fair value determination has also arisen in cases
involving proxy statement nondisclosures which constitute violations
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 48" Like state courts, the
federal courts have had problems in fleshing out the elusive "fair
477. See supra text accompanying notes 452, 453.
478. See supra notes 337-39.
479. See supra text accompanying notes 238-349.
480. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714.
481. Id.
482. Id.
483. While the court does not define fair value as the value of 100 percent
ownership, the court certainly does not preclude fair value from equaling the value
of 100 percent ownership.
484. See infra text accompanying notes 485-572.
485. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter cited as "the 1934 Act"] This
section of the note will deal with section 14(a) (and the Rule promulgated thereunder):
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by
any means or instrumentality of interestate commerce or of any facility
of a national securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to
solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent
or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted
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value" concept. ' Some circuits have adopted the "efficient market"
approach of valuation analysis.487 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
has used the efficient market hypothesis as a starting point for the
fair value analysis; the resultant fair value was based in part on a
sharing of the synergy.482 The analysis in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co.489 is a good example of this approach.
Auto-Lite was a diversified company engaged primarily in the
sale of auto parts.49 Mergenthaler, which primarily produced type-
setting equipment, began purchasing Auto-Lite's stock in 1957."9' By
March of 1962, Mergenthaler owned 54.2 percent of Auto-Lite, and
thus was able to obtain control of Auto-Lite's board of directors.
49 2
In early 1963, Mergenthaler attempted to merge Mergenthaler and
Auto-Lite into a new company named Eltra Corporation.493 On May
28, 1963, Auto-Lite's board of directors, controlled by Mergenthaler,
voted to accept the proposed merger.4" Proxies including a proxy state-
ment were sent the next day to Auto-Lite's shareholders.495 An addi-
tional thirteen percent vote from Auto-Lite's minority shareholders
security) registered pursuant to section 781 of this title.
15 U.S.C. 178n(a) (1976).
Rule 14a-9 promulgated thereunder.
(a) No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of
any proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communica-
tion, written or oral, containing any statement which, at the time and
in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or
misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any
material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false
or misleading or necessary to correct any statement in any earlier com-
munication with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting
or subject matter which has become false or misleading.
17 C.F.R. 240.14a-9.
486. Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Tiger Int'l, Inc., 600 F.2d 355 (2d Cir.
1979). The court in Mills used the efficient market hypothesis to establish fair value.
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 281 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ill. 1967), rev'd on causality
issue, 403 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 396 U.S. 375 (1970); on remand, 552 F.2d 1239
(7th Cir. 1977).
487. We hold that when market value is available and reliable, other factors
should not be utilized in determining whether the terms of a merger were fair. Although
criteria such as earnings and book value are an indication of actual worth, they are
only secondary indicia. Mills, 552 F.2d at 1247. See also supra note 486.
488. Mills, 352 F.2d at 1249.
489. 281 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ill. 1967), rev'd on causality issue, 403 F.2d 429
(7th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 396 U.S. 375 (1970); on remand, 552 F.2d 1239 (1977).
490. Mills, 552 F.2d at 1240.
491. Id.
492. Id.
493. Id.
494. Id.
495. Id.
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was necessary in order to obtain the required two-thirds vote.49 The
merger was approved on June 27, 1963."9' As a result, the minority
shareholders of Auto-Lite instituted a class action suit challenging the
corporate merger.
498
The plaintiffs filed suit in district court on June 26, 1963, alleg-
ing that the proxy statement did not disclose that Auto-Lite's board
of directors was controlled by Mergenthaler.'4' Therefore, they argued
the proxy statement was in violation of section 14(a) of the 1934 Act.'0
The minority shareholders requested that the merger be set aside.
The district court found for the plaintiffs, but the appellate court
reversed on the issue of causation.
5 0
'
The United States Supreme Court reversed, stating that the
plaintiffs had made a sufficient showing of causation by proving that
the necessary proxies had been obtained by means of material
misrepresentations.0 Further, the Supreme Court stated that the
lower court was not required to set aside the merger, but could look
to other remedies, such as monetary relief .' The Supreme Court sug-
gested two possible methods of determining potential monetary
relief.0 4 First, the minority shareholders might be compensated for
a reduction in their stock's earnings potential as a result of the
merger." However, if the plaintiffs could not show such a reduction
in earnings potential, an award could be based on the "fairness" of
the merger terms at the time of the merger. 6 The district court, on
remand, decided not to rescind the merger, rather it applied the second
method of determining damages, as suggested by the Supreme Court.'
496. Id.
497. Id.
498. Id.
499. Id.
500. See supra note 485.
501. Mills, 403 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1968).
502. Mills, 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
503. The Supreme Court then stated that since, "the misleading aspect of the
solicitation did not relate to terms of the merger, monetary relief might be afforded
to the shareholders only if the merger resulted in a reduction of the earnings poten-
tial of their holdings." However, if this decrease in earnings potential could not be
determined, because of the commingling of assets, a "fairness" approach might be us-
ed. The fairness approach envisioned an award based on the "fairness" of the merger
terms at the time of the merger. Further, the Supreme Court noted that the two
methods illustrated for determining monetary relief were not to be considered ex-
clusive. Mills 396 U.S. at 388-89.
504. Mills, 396 U.S. at 389.
505. Id.
506. Id.
507. Mills, 552 F.2d at 1243.
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The district court determined the merger terms were unfair and
awarded damages of $1,233,918.35 plus interest."' Both parties
appealed.'
No Reduction In Earnings Potential
On the second appeal, the primary issue was to determine what
damages, if any, could be awarded as a result of the proxy
nondisclosure. ° The appellate court examined both suggested methods
of determining monetary damages." First, as to whether the plain-
tiff was entitled to compensation for a loss in potential earnings power,
the appellate court compared Auto-Lite's dividend policy with the divi-
dend policy of the newly formed firm.2 The analysis began by look-
ing at the exchange ratio of the merger offer." 3 For every one share
of Auto-Lite stock, the minority shareholder was to receive 1.88
"preferred" shares of Eltra's stock, the new company." 4
After examining the exchange ratio, the amount of dividends was
calculated.5 At the time of the merger, Auto-Lite was paying a divi-
dend of $2.40 per share and Mergenthaler was paying $1 per share. 1
Under the merger agreement Eltra was to pay dividends of $1 per
share for common stock and $1.40 per share for preferred stock. 17
The appellate court determined that the proposed dividends to Auto-
Lite's minority shareholders would increase by $.23 per share from
$2.40 per share to $2.63 per share. 8 Eltra's preferred stock was more
valuable than Auto-Lite's common stock, because the stock paid higher
dividends, was more secure, and was convertible into common shares."'
Therefore, the appellate court concluded that the earnings potential
of Auto-Lite's minority shareholders' stock was enhanced, rather than
weakened, by the merger.2
508. Id. at 1244 n.4.
509. Id. at 1241.
510. Part of this major issue is choosing the proper method of determining
fairness of merger terms when the solicitor of the merger both controls the board
and fails to disclose such control.
511. Mills, 552 F.2d at 1242-50.
512. Note the assumption that the company's value is reflective of the com-
pany's dividend policy.
513. Mills, 552 F.2d at 1241.
514. Id. at 1242.
515. Id.
516. Id.
517. Id.
518. Calculated by the following: (1.88 X $1.40=$2.63) Id.
519. Id.
520. Id.
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Next the appellate court looked at the subsequent performance
of Eltra's stock and determined that Auto-Lite's shareholders received
more than a fair price for their stock in Auto-Lite.2 ' Eltra's preferred
stock was being sold in the month following the merger for $31.06.52
Eltra's common stock sold for $25.25 during the same period." Due
to the 1.88 exchange ratio afforded Auto-Lite's minority shareholders,
they received a cash equivalent of $58.39 per share.52 ' Because
Mergenthaler's stock was exchanged at a 1 to 1 ratio, Auto-Lite's
minority shareholders received 2.31 times the value of Mergenthaler's
stock.25
Finally, with respect to proving a reduction of potential earn-
ings, Auto-Lite's minority shareholders alleged that Eltra appropriated
liquid assets from the old divisions belonging to Auto-Lite and shifted
the liquid assets to other divisions."' The appellate court pointed out
that after the merger the divisions became one economic entity.527
Therefore, Eltra's management was merely increasing the efficiency
of the company by transferring assets to where they would be most
productive. 2' This action would benefit both Auto-Lite's minority
shareholders and Mergenthaler's shareholders."s Auto-Lite's minori-
ty shareholders then noted that post merger operations of the divi-
sion associated with Auto-Lite produced almost 5 times more profit
than the divisions associated with Mergenthaler.1 The minority share-
holders contended that this disparity in profitability proved that the
price paid for Auto-Lite, which was 2.31 times Mergenthaler's stock
value, was inadequate."'
However, the appellate court noted that use of post-merger per-
formance assumes the divisions operated independently from each
other." Therefore, the profits could have resulted from the input of
Mergenthaler's talent, economies of scale, or quality of management.
521. Id.
522. Id.
523. Id.
524. Calculated by the following: ($1.88 X 31.06 = $58.39) Id.
525. Calculated by the following: ($58.39 + $25.25 2.31) Id.
526. Id.
527. Id.
528. Id.
529. Id.
530. Id. at 1243.
531. Id.
532. Id.
533. Id.
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Since the assets were commingled, post-merger performance could not
be indicative of the fairness of the merger.'
Even without the commingling of assets, the appellate court held
that post-merger evidence could at best create only a rebuttable
inference of unfairness.535 It was impossible to know whether the
increase of earnings of one partner to a merger was predictable at
the time of the merger."' The court found that the plaintiff did not
prove that the defendant should have known Auto-Lite's business
would become more profitable than the rest of the company.
No Justifiable Damages Based On Unfairness
After finding no reduction in earnings potential, the court
reviewed the fairness question."7 The appellate court first looked to
the analysis of the district court.' The district court based its damages
on the assessment of fairness at the time of the merger.3 9 Five fac-
tors were considered: (1) The market value of the companies' stock;
(2) The companies' earnings; (3) The companies' asset book value; (4)
The dividends paid by each company; (5) Other qualitative factors.4
The district court found that earnings and book values
demonstrated that the merger was unfair."1 The court determined that
a fair exchange ratio would be 2.35 shares of Eltra's stock for each
share of Auto-lite's stock." The district court further found that Auto-
Lite's minority shareholders actually received an equivalent of 2.25
shares of Eltra common stock for each share of Auto-Lite stock."3
Therefore, the court awarded damages of $1,233,918.35 based on the
.10 difference."4 Further, the district court found that market value
was unreliable and discounted the importance of dividend policy.45
534. Id.
535. Id. at 1244.
536. Id.
537. Id.
538. Id.
539. Id.
540. Id.
541. Id.
542. Id.
543. This calculation of a 2.25 exchange ratio is incorrect. Id. at 1244 n.6.
544. Id. at 1244.
545. The district court discounted the significance of the comparative market
values of Auto-Lite and Mergenthaler, because in the preceding five years there were
purchases of Auto-Lite's stock by both Auto-Lite and Mergenthaler and purchases of
Mergenthaler's stock by American Manufacturing Co. The appellate court dismissed
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The appellate court held that the market price nearest to the
merger was reliable and reflected the value of the companies.54
However, to account for any short term price fluctuations, an average
price for a period of six months prior to the merger date was used."7
The court found the ratio between the average stock prices was 2.1
and was fairly stable over a two year period.u8
The appellate court then compared the before merger stock prices
and the effective exchange ratio. The 2.119 ratio of premerger stock
prices was compared to the 2.31' ratio calculated from the ultimate
price"6 1 of Eltra's preferred stock times the 1.88 exchange ratio given
to Auto-Lite's minority shareholders divided by the price of Eltra's
the assessment of unreliability due to the small nature of the purchases in question
when compared to the total stock sales of either company. Id. at 1245. Further, a
greater number of purchases of Auto-Lite took place during the last three years prior
to the merger, which if affecting the stock price at all would tend to inflate the price. Id.
546. We hold that when market value is available and reliable, other
factors should not be utilized in determining whether the terms of a merger
were fair. Although criteria such as earnings and book value are an
indication of actual worth, they are only secondary indicia. In a market
economy, market value will always be the primary gauge of an enter-
prise's worth. In this case thousands of shares of Auto-Lite and Mergen-
thaler were traded on the New York Stock Exchange during the first
part of 1963 by outside investors who had access to their full gamut of
financial information about both corporations, including earnings and book
value. If we were to independently assess criteria other than market value
in our effort to determine whether the merger terms were fair, we would
be substituting our abstract judgment for that of the market. Aside from
the problems that would arise in deciding how much weight to give each
criterion, such a method would be economically unsound.
Id. at 1247-48.
The plaintiff argued that Mergenthaler used its control over Auto-Lite to force
it to pay high dividends, thus depressing its price, i.e., draining Auto-Lite's capital
while raising the price of Mergenthaler by giving Mergenthaler funds in the form
if dividends?. The appellate court stated that increased dividends should have made
Auto-Lite's stock more attractive. Id. at 1247.
Because of this dividend policy and a change in the industry, Auto-Lite minority
shareholders claimed that only during the period between 1958 and 1960 did the market
value reflect an accurate value. The appellate court found this argument unacceptable.
The market value in 1961 reflected the uncertainty of Auto-Lite's future and continued
to do so until the merger. Id.
547. Id. at 1246.
548. Id. at 1246 n.10.
549. See supra note 525.
550. Eltra's preferred stock price X 1.88 + Eltra's common stock price = $31.06
X 1.88 + $25.25 = 2.31.
551. Mills, 552 F.2d at 1246.
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common stock. 2 Since the ratio comparison assumes that the value
of the ultimate company, Eltra, was merely the sum of the two com-
panies' values, it did not take into account synergy.553 However, the
appellate court held that fair value should include an element of the
synergy created by the merger."
Effect Of Synergy On Fair Value
The appellate court accepted and applied the analysis propounded
by Professor Brudney and Chirelstein, which requires consideration
of synergy in finding fair value.' Therefore, the court found that ratio
analysis alone might lead to incorrect results.5" Professors Brudney
and Chirelstein argued that the minority shareholder should be com-
pensated for not only the market value of his stock, but also a por-
tion of the increase in the value of the ultimate company resulting
from the synergy created by the merger.5 7 The proportion the
minority shareholder should receive is directly related to their pro-
porational share of ownership.'
552. Id.
553. Id. at 1248. See also supra notes 449, 450 and text accompanying notes.
Since the ratio's incorporated post merger values, the values already accounted for
any synergy resulting from the merger. In short, the post merger values represent
the value of a minority equity interest of the post merger concern. Since the Mills
Court chose a value greater than that based on the post merger market prices, the
court was defining "fair value" as a value larger than the value of a minority interest
in the post merger firm.
554. Mills, 552 F.2d at 1248.
555. Brudney and Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers,
88 HAR. L. REV. 297, 308-09 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Brudney].
556. Id.
557. Id.
558. The appellate court applied Professors Brudney and Chirelstein's approach
through the following calculations:
GIVEN: (AT THE TIME OF THE MERGER)
1. 532,550 share of Auto-Lite were held by the minority shareholders;
2. 2,698,822 shares of Mergenthaler were outstanding;
3. During the first part of 1963 Auto-Lite's average per share price was $52.25;
4. During the first part of 1963 Mergenthaler's average per share
price = $24.875;
5. POST MERGER VALUES (one month after merger) Eltra's com-
mon = $25.25; Eltra's preferred stock = $58.39 (to Auto-Lite's minority
shareholder based on the 1.88 exchange ratio).
CALCULATIONS:
1. 532,550 X 52.25 = $27,825,737 (PREMERGER VALUE OF Auto-Lite)
2. 2,698,822 X 24.875 = $67,133,197 (PREMERGER VALUE OF Mergenthaler)
3. SUMMATION (1. + 2.) = $94,958,934 (POST MERGER VALUE, NO
SYNERGY)
4. The minority shareholder owns 29.3 percent of Eltra
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Applying the Brudney and Chirelstein approach, the appellate
court found that the minority shareholders received more than a fair
price for their stock. 59 Auto-Lite's minority shareholders received in
excess of the proportion of synergy they were entitled to receive.56
Therefore, the minority shareholders could not show damages as a
result of the "unfair" merger terms."'
Summary Of The Approach Adopted By The Court In Mills
The approach adopted in Mills defines "fair value" as the market
value of the minority shareholder's stock plus a proportional share
of any synergy that may result from the merger.' It follows that
the value sought is greater than the minority value, but less than
the value to the acquirer. 6' In determining the fair value, the federal
approach begins by using the efficient market hypothesis. 4 The effi-
cient market hypothesis states that the traded price is equal to the
minority value of the firm.6 This federal approach then examines the
synergy"6 which might have resulted from the transaction.67
ACTUAL POST MERGER VALUE
1. 532,550 X 58.39 = $31,095,594
2. 2,698,822 X 25.25 = $68,145,255
3. SUMMATION (1. + 2.) = $99,240,894 (POST MERGER VALUE WITH
SYNERGY)
SYNERGY = $99,240,894-$94,958,934 = $4,281,915 X 29.3%) + $27,825,737
$29,080,338. $29,080,338 is equivalent to 1,151,696.5 shares of Eltra at $25.25 per share
or a 2.16 ratio.
The Auto-Lite minority shareholders actually received $31,095,594 which is
$2,015,256 more than $29,080,338. The court held that 2.16 shares of Eltra common
per share of Auto-Lite would have been fair, when in fact the minority shareholder
received an equivalent of 2.31 of Eltra's common.
559. Id. at 1249.
560. Id.
561. Id.
562. Mills, 552 F.2d at 1248.
563. The Mills court used the efficient market hypothesis to establish the market
value of the stocks. By definition, this value objective is the value of a minority interest
in a going concern prior to the merger or transaction. The court further added a por-
tion of the synergy that resulted from the merger. Because the market price should
already reflect synergy, the court might be using the concept of synergy to reflect
an objective value greater than the value of the minority shareholder, which would
be the market price. However, only a proportional amount of the synergy was awarded
to the minority shareholders; thus the resultant value must be less than the value
to the acquirer. The value to the acquirer would include all the synergy value.
564. See supra notes 487, 546.
565. See supra text accompanying notes 360-74.
566. See supra note 453.
567. Mills, 552 F.2d at 1248.
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If synergy did result, the fair value should be based on a pro-
portional split of the synergy between the majority shareholder and
the minority shareholders." 8 Consequently, if the price paid for the
minority shareholder's stock is less than the stock price plus his pro-
portional share of the synergy, he will be able to prove damages." 9
If, on the other hand, as in Mills, the stock is acquired by the majority
shareholder at a price in excess of the market price plus the minori-
ty shareholder's proportional share of the synergy, the minority
shareholder will not be able to show damages.70 Therefore, the Mills
court established certain guidelines for finding damages based on the
value of a minority shareholder's interest, plus a proportional share
of any synergy created by the transaction.71
Although Mills established a concept of fair value, the guidelines
established in finding fair value have limited usefulness. The analysis
used in Mills requires a market value hindsight approach where two
publicly traded companies merge using an exchange of stock to form
a third, publicly traded company. In a cash out transaction or in a
situation where the resulting companies are no longer publicly traded,
the Mills analysis would not be useful. However, as in most areas
of the law, legal guidelines eliminating uncertainty and providing fair
notice even in limited areas are desirable." This note suggests a
methodology to establish guidelines in determining "fair value" that
are both more flexible and have more applications. The proposed
guidelines can be used in both SEC violations and state freeze-out
actions.
SECTION VI-A NEW APPROACH TO AN OLD
PROBLEM: DETERMINING "FAIR VALUE"
The proposed guidelines utilize the modern valuation principles
previously discussed,57 which are allowed in Delaware freeze-out
actions subsequent to Weinberger and are used in civil actions under
the federal securities laws.57 The proposed objective of the valuation
is to determine fair value within the spectrum of possible arm's length
values.7 The analytical guidelines link the concept of fairness in deal-
568. See Brudney supra note 555.
569. Mills, 552 F.2d at 1248.
570. Id. at 1249.
571. Id.
572. Brudney, supra note 555, at 345-46.
573. See supra text accompanying notes 350-423.
574. See supra text accompanying notes 238-349, 485-572.
575. See supra text accompanying notes 424-84.
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ing with the dissenting or minority shareholder to the concept of find-
ing a fair value."' Utilizing the proposed guidelines, the degree of
unfair dealing determines the level of fair value to the minority
shareholder. Therefore, the proposed analysis starts with a fairness
determination in dealing with the minority shareholder.
Step 1: Determining The Degree Of Fair Dealing
The determination of fair dealing is currently the necessary first
step in both state freeze-out actions as well as actions under the 1934
Securities Act. In federal courts, to sustain an action alleging a viola-
tion of section 10(b) under the 1934 Act, 77 the plaintiff must allege
a high level of culpability or unfair dealing in the form of reckless
or intentional misrepresentation."7 In the private civil actions such
576. This is consistent with the entire fairness concept propounded by the
Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger. "However, the test of fairness is not a bifur-
cated one as between fair dealing and price. All aspects of the issue must be examined
as a whole since the question is one of entire fairness." Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
577. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 S 10(b); 15 U.S.C. S 78j (1976).
It shall be unlaw for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange-
(a) To effect a short sale, or to use or employ any stop-loss order in
connection with the purchase or sale, of any security registered on a
national securities exchange, in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale, of any
security registered on a national securities exchange, or any security not
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in con-
travention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors.
Rule 10b-5, promulgated thereunder:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange-
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5.
578. The United States Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, holding that to maintain a civil cause of action under the SEC Rule
10b-5, the plaintiff must allege a scienter, or an "intent to deceive, manipulate or
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as Mills which involved violations of section 14(a) of the 1934 Act,
the required culpable conduct is merely the negligent preparation of
a proxy statement which contains material misrepresentations or
omissions."9 Therefore, in order to determine whether the standards
of culpability required under section 10(b) and section 14(a) have been
met, the court must inquire into the defendant's level of unfair
dealing."'
In actions involving violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the
1934 Act, section 10(b) and Securities Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder, the court must first determine whether the
defendant had the requisite scienter 81 It then must find either a
misrepresentation or omission of a material fact with respect to the
purchase or sale of a security.5 The United States Supreme Court
in Santa Fe Industries v. Green," an action brought under Rule 10b-5,
held that the plaintiff must allege more than breach of fiduciary duty;'
he must allege that the defendant possessed the scienter required
under Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.5"5 Although the fundamental pur-
pose of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 is "to substitute a
defraud." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). Some lower court
cases have held that reckless conduct by the defendant might be enough to sustain
a civil cause of action. However, Ernst holds that more than mere negligence must
be found to sustain a 10b-5 cause of action. Ernst, 425 U.S. at 201. See also infra note 579.
579. The issue of culpability with respect to civil actions under SEC 14(a) has
not yet been decided by the United States Supreme Court. However, courts, such
as Mills, have allowed actions involving misleading statements or omissions which might
have resulted from mere negligence. See supra note 485, and text accompanying notes
485-572.
580. See supra note 578.
581. Id.
582. The plaintiffs met the requirement that they purchased, or in this case
sold, their stock relying on the information disclosed. Superintendent of Insurance v.
Banker's Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971), but the nondisclosure was found
to be immaterial. Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977), on remand,
562 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1977).
583. 430 U.S. 462 (1977), on remand, 562 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1977).
584. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 473-74. The facts in Santa Fe are the same as the
facts in Kirby. See text accompanying notes 485-563. The plaintiff brought a federal
cause of action against Santa Fe for violation of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. However,
the court did not find either "deceptive or manipulative" conduct by the plaintiff.
Although the plaintiffs alleged a breach of fiduciary duty, they did not allege any
deception, misrepresentation or material nondisclosure. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 476. See
also supra note 578.
585. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). To maintain a 10b-5 cause of action the plaintiff must
allege deceptive or manipulative conduct on the part of the defendant. Santa Fe, 430
U.S. at 473-74. See also supra note 578.
[Vol.19
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 [1985], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss2/6
"FAIR VALUE" DETERMINATION
philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor,
... ."I" The court requires more than unfair fiduciary conduct before
a cause of action can be maintained under the anti-fraud provisions
of the 1934 Act.587
Therefore, the first step in a federal action under section 14(a)
or 10(b) of the 1934 Act is to determine whether the defendant was
negligent in misrepresenting or omitting a material fact for section
14(a), or whether the defendant had the requisite scienter for section
10(b). Either finding requires the court to determine what level of
unfair dealing, if any, was conducted by the defendant, and what, if
any, remedy is adequate. State freeze-out cause of actions also require
a determination regarding fair dealing.
58
In state freeze-out actions, unlike federal civil actions under the
1934 Act, the courts must consider all levels of fairness." 9 The
Weinberger court mandated an examination of the degree of fair deal-
ing in order to determine whether the plaintiff is merely dissatisfied
with the price offered, or whether a breach of fiduciary duty occurred,
or whether an intentional misrepresentation occurred.5 When direc-
tors with dual responsibilities deal with the minority shareholders,
the Weinberger decision dictates a two part fairness analysis which
explicitly examines first "fair dealing" and then "fair value."59'
The Weinberger court noted that the directors affiliated with the
majority shareholder, Signal, possessed dual responsibilities. 5"9 The
directors owed a fiduciary duty of complete candor, or entire fairness,
to both parties. The directors' dual function precluded arm's length
dealings with the minority shareholders. 93 Therefore, when dealing
586. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972), quoting,
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
587. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that "once full and fair disclosure
has occurred, the fairness of the terms of the transaction is at most a tangential con-
cern of the statute." Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 478. Cf, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
396 U.S. 375, 381-85 (1970). See also supra note 578.
588. See supra note 576.
589. A shareholder may be able to demand an appraisal without alleging any
unfair dealing. His appraisal right might be granted by statute. See e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, S 262 (1981).
590. See supra note 576.
591. Id.
592. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710.
593. The court in dictum suggested that arm's length negotiations might have
been possible if UOP would have appointed an independent committee comprised of
its outside directors to negotiate with Signal's directors. Id. at 709 n.7.
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with the minority shareholders the directors, representing the majority
shareholder, have a primary obligation of "fair dealing. 5 9' The court
further noted that an arm's length negotiated price was the objective
of such "fair dealing."55 In both Weinberger and Lynch, the court found
the majority did not deal fairly with the minority shareholders.5 In
both cases the majority shareholder was in breach of its fiduciary
duty. 97 Thus, both courts at least considered damages beyond those
available from the traditional appraisal concept. In Lynch, the court
found rescissory damages were the appropriate remedy, 99 while in
Weinberger the court left the application of rescissory damages to the
discretion of the chancellor on remand.5
Unlike Lynch and Weinberger, the courts in the earlier Kirby
and Santa Fe cases did not find any major unfair dealing between
the majority shareholder and the minority shareholders. 00 Therefore,
the application of a traditional appraisal remedy was deemed adequate
to assure the minority shareholder would receive the premerger value
of a proportional interest in the going concern."1 This value, the lowest
on the spectrum of possible arm's length values, was the objective
of the traditional appraisal remedy. 2 In summary, while earlier
Delaware cases, such as Kirby, recognized a fiduciary duty of entire
fairness by the majority shareholder,' the Weinberger court, in a situa-
tion where unfair dealing was found, expanded the fairness concept
to a two step analysis which requires an examination of both "fair
dealing" and "fair value."'"
Step 2: Link Fair Dealing With Fair Value
The second part of the proposed analysis links fair dealing with
fair value; a variation of the theory "let the punishment fit the
594. "When directors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a trans-
action, they are required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous
interest in fairness of the bargain." Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710.
595. Id. at 711.
596. See supra text accompanying notes 168-349.
597. See supra text accompanying notes 168-349.
598. See supra text accompanying notes 225-34.
599. See supra text accompanying notes 338-49.
600. Kirby, 413 A.2d at 140. See also supra note 587.
601. See supra text accompanying notes 163-67.
602. The court's objective was to find the minority shareholder's interest in
the premerger value of a going concern. Kirby, 413 A.2d at 141.
603. Id.
604. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
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crime."6"5 If a high level of unfair dealing is found by the court, the
fair value for the minority shareholder should be found within the
spectrum of possible arm's length values, but at a high level. However,
if no unfair dealing is found, the fair value for a minority shareholder
should likewise be found on the spectrum of possible arm's length
values, but at a low level. Although an infinite number of fairness
levels exist, this note considers the fair value concept under the follow-
ing situations:
1. Complete fairness level-Where the majority
shareholder dealt fairly with the minority shareholders, but
the dissenting shareholder merely viewed the consideration
for his stock as too low.
2. An unfair level-Where the majority shareholder
breached a fiduciary duty in his dealings with the minority
shareholders.
3. A highly unfair level-Where the majority shareholder
either recklessly or intentionally misled the minority
shareholders.
Using the proposed guidelines, the objective under the first level
is to determine the fair value at the lowest level of possible arm's
length values, the value of a minority interest. 6 Determination of this
value was also the objective of the traditional Delaware block valua-
tion method. 07 In Delaware and jurisdictions which follow Delaware's
lead, modern analysis can now be used to determine this value as
previously described. 6 The objectives of the corporation statutes are
promoted by finding a fair value at the lowest level in cases where
fair dealing is found. 9 The result of such a policy should be to pro-
mote mergers and cash-out transactions with full disclosure and
fairness, while providing the minority shareholders an incentive for
not demanding an appraisal merely in hopes of reaping a windfall
profit. 1 However, a higher level of unfair dealing would necessitate
605. Weinberger stated that fair dealing and fair value are not bifurcated tests.
See supra note 576. Therefore, a balancing approach to the components of entire fairness
is appropriate.
606. The proposed guidelines are consistent with the Kirby holding. Where
fair dealing is found, the appropriate value would be the value of a minority interest.
607. See supra notes 18, 108.
608. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712.
609. One purpose of the corporation statutes is to "fully compensate shareholders
for whatever their loss may be." Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 715. However, the analysis
proposed in Weinberger is couched in terms of fairness, implying just results.
610. If the minority shareholder knows approximately the price he could expect
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a finding of fair value on a higher level of possible arm's length values.
In situations where the majority shareholder breached a fiduciary
duty, the fair value should be found at a higher level of value than
the value of a minority interest. This value, while difficult to deter-
mine precisely, should reflect the degree of unfair dealing which
occurred. 1 ' If a serious violation of fiduciary duty is found, a high
arm's length value of an 100 percent owner, would be appropriate."1 2
In contrast, if the breach of fiduciary duty or the nondisclosure, though
material, was not serious, a lower value should be considered such
as the value of a minority interest adjusted for the undisclosed infor-
mation, or, as in the case of a two-step merger, the value of controll-
ing interest. 1 '
By proportionally increasing the finding of fair value to compen-
sate the minority shareholder for the majority shareholder's practice
of unfair dealing, the majority shareholder is deprived of any wind-
fall profits resulting from his unfair practices. The majority
shareholder should, therefore, be deterred from dealing unfairly with
the minority shareholder. At the same time, because the minority
shareholder may benefit from stopping (or slowing them down by filing
suit) the majority shareholders' unfair practices, he is encouraged to
bring a suit when the majority shareholder does deal unfairly. " ' To
effectuate this objective, if the unfair dealing reaches an extreme,
the highest level of damages would be required to justify "fair value." '
If the majority shareholder recklessly or intentionally misled the
from the courts, he would be discouraged from bringing frivolous appraisal actions
when the majority shareholder dealt fairly with him.
611. At the judge's discretion, he would compensate the minority shareholder
in terms of fair value for the level of unfair dealing attained by the defendant.
612. Where a breach of fiduciary duty was found, the Weinberger court allowed
the value of 100 percent ownership ownership to be tested as a fair value. The court
stated that the chancellor at his discretion could include elements of rescissory damages,
if he found "fraud, misrepresentation, self dealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets,
or gross and palpable overreaching. ... Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714.
613. A two-step merger is one where the acquiring entity first purchases con-
trolling interest, then shortly thereafter purchases the balance of the firm's equity.
Brudney and Chirelstein advocate giving the minority shareholder the value of the
controlling interest at a minimum when two-step mergers are involved. Brudney, supra
note 555, at 340-41.
614. Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), was the
first private cause of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See supra note 577.
This "private attorney general" concept is encouraged as a means of enforcing the
SEC rules.
615. Complete rescission or depriving the wrongdoer of the benefit of the
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minority shareholders, the appropriate remedy would be to value the
minority interest at the highest possible arm's length value, the value
to the acquirer." ' This value is greater than rescissory damages
because it includes value which is solely related to the acquiring com-
pany, or majority shareholder. The value to the acquirer includes the
value of synergy, a characteristic unique to the acquiring company."7
The acquiring company might have been able to realize this synergy
value by acquiring another similarly situated company. Therefore, by
giving this portion of value to the minority shareholder, he is receiv-
ing something which was not part of his ownership interest in the
firm. Consequently, the minority shareholder actually benefits from
the wrongful or fraudulent activity of the majority shareholder, if he
institutes legal action. The benefit received will encourage private
civil actions against fraudulent activities, while deterring such
activities by the majority shareholder."8
Summary And Benefits Of The Proposed Analysis
The approach advocated by this note defines fair value as a value
within the range of possible arm's length values,"1 " but bases the level
of fair value on the degree of unfair dealing by the majority
shareholder." This concept is consistent with the objectives and find-
ings of fair value in both the federal and state jurisdictions. The
guidelines resulting from the proposed concept will reduce uncertainty,
and thus promote merger and cash-out activities, but on a fair basis.
Adoption of any guidelines would be beneficial because some
uncertainty will be removed from the market.21 Companies and
bargain would be appropriate when extreme unfairness occurs.
616. This would require the calculation of the value to the acquirer. Therefore,
the reason for the merger would have to be given or hypothesized so that the value
of synergy could be determined. See supra notes 452, 453.
617. Id.
618. Professor Winters argues that the various jurisdictions, in trying to attract
new incorporations within their state, will not gravitate to the bottom; that is, pro-
vide little or no protection for the minority shareholder in order to protect the firm's
management. Rather, each jurisdiction will provide minority shareholder protection
because such protection eliminates risk, which enhances the value of the company's
stock. An increase in stock value reduces the firm's cost of equity, thereby increasing
the value of the firm. Management will, therefore, incorporate in states that provide
some management protection, as well as some minority shareholder protection. Winters,
State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. L. STUD.
251 (1977).
619. See supra text accompanying notes 424-84.
620. See supra text accompanying notes 573-618.
621. By reducing uncertainty, planning is facilitated.
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majority shareholders will have fair notice regarding the possible con-
sequences resulting from their failure to deal fairly with the minority
shareholders. The proposed guidelines facilitate planning by reliev-
ing some uncertainty about the costs of acquisitions, therefore
promoting additional acquisitions and efficient use of available capital.
The minority shareholder will also benefit from definite guidelines.
The minority shareholder will know what he can expect from
his investment, and will be encouraged to sell his stock if treated
fairly or to pursue relief if he is treated unfairly. 22 If the majority
shareholder deals fairly and offers a price that represents the value
of a minority interest, the minority shareholder will be discouraged
from pursuing the expensive and time consuming appraisal remedy.
On the other hand, if a majority shareholder deals unfairly with a
minority shareholder, the minority shareholder will know he can
receive an adequate remedy through the courts, thus promoting
private attorney general actions. In sum, the proposed analysis will
promote the policies of the state and federal statutes and encourage
their enforcement.
SECTION VII- CONCLUSION
In the 1983 Weinberger case, the Delaware Supreme Court
eliminated an outmoded, misleading, and restrictive valuation analysis
termed the "Delaware block." The Delaware Supreme Court has
opened the door to the use of modern financial valuation analysis and
expanded the traditional restriction of the "going concern value" to
other possible arm's length values such as the value of 100 percent
ownership. While the court has not clarified whether it is defining
fair value in light of possible arm's length values or is merely allow-
ing additional elements to be weighed in determining fair value, it
has held the majority shareholders more accountable to the minority
shareholders. No matter what form the future appraisals take in
Delaware, the wide range of arm's length values can now be considered
in the valuation analysis.
Delaware has taken a giant step toward protection of the
minority shareholder, a step which should benefit all parties: the
minority shareholders, the majority shareholders, the corporations and
the state. However, the next important step to be taken is the adop-
tion of a flexible set of guidelines expounding the "fairness" concept.
Guidelines such as those propounded by this note will facilitate
622. See supra note 612.
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planning and provide fair notice through increased consistency in the
holdings. They will further the aims of the federal and state statutes,
facilitate corporate planning, and provide additional minority
shareholder protection.
DONALD E. SCHLYER
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